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ABSTRACT 
Listening to Ourselves, Each Other, and the World: 
A Study ofHeidegger's Concepts of Discourse and Language 
by 
James Patrick Andrus 
In this thesis, I argue two main points concerning the significance and 
development of Martin Heidegger' s concepts of discourse and language. The first is that 
his concept of discourse, which for the Heidegger of Being and Time is the human 
practice of articulating meaning or intelligibility, has often been misunderstood as either 
(a) simply another name for natural languages, or (b) a wholly prelinguistic and 
precommunicative phenomenon. I attempt to find a middle way between these two 
interpretations that, on my view, is truer to the text, and argue that although discourse 
does sometimes manifest itselfprelinguistically, it is also an essentially communicative 
phenomenon. The second point I argue is that contrary to the usual interpretation of his 
development, Heidegger' s "tum" to "language" in his later works does not constitute an 
embrace of linguistic idealism, i.e. the belief that one can only encounter as meaningful 
objects that have been named in one's natural language. Instead, I argue that it remains, 
like discourse, a prelinguistic phenomenon, and I also note several interesting parallels 
between the two concepts. I conclude by making some suggestions about what is really at 
stake in the transition from discourse to language, and argue that the key difference lies in 
the fact that, for the later Heidegger, the articulation of meaning is no longer primarily a 
communicative phenomenon rooted in human activity. 
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Introduction 
A common view of the development ofHeidegger's philosophy from Being and 
Time to his later works is well summarized by Joseph P. Fell's pithy assertion that it 
shifts "from what might be called a prelinguistic ground to a linguistic ground" (Fell 
1979, 197). By this Fell means that while Heidegger argues in his early works that 
meaning is constituted by the "prelinguistic" phenomena of disposition, understanding, 
and discourse, which he dubs the existentiale, the transition to the "later Heidegger" 
involves Heidegger advancing the idea that ordinary languages are in fact human beings' 
sole source of meaning and significance. According to this view, Heidegger's later 
thought is a form of linguistic idealism or linguistic constitutionalism 1 - a belief that what 
things are is what they are constituted as by our various ontic2 languages (such as French, 
English, German, and Swahili). Linguistic idealism has many and various consequences, 
but one of the most unsettling is that the languages we speak essentially limit what 
entities we can encounter, for the bounds of our world, i.e. the context of significance in 
which we carry out our lives, are equivalent to the bounds of our language's expressive 
possibilities. Under this interpretation, then, language for the later Heidegger becomes, to 
borrow Mark Wrathall's phrase, the "Big House of being." Throughout the paper, we 
shall refer to this understanding of the development ofHeidegger's thought with respect 
1 I will use these terms interchangeably throughout this paper. 
2 "Ontic" is a term used by Heidegger to denote a particular being as opposed to being itself. The 
investigation into being itself, or into the meaning of being, is ontological in that it does not seek to 
understand a particular kind of being. As Heidegger writes, "The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. If 
we are to understand the problem of Being, our first philosophical step consists in not ... 'telling a story'-
that is to say, in not defining entities as entities by tracing them back to their origin to some other entities, 
as if Being had the character of some possible entity. Hence Being, as that which is asked about, must be 
exhibited in a way of its own, essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered" 
(Heidegger 1962, 26). This distinction is of vital importance for Heidegger, and is usually referred to as the 
"ontological difference." 
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to language the "standard view."3 
The standard view of Heidegger' s development is well entrenched in the 
secondary literature, and there is much in his often ambiguous writings to lend it support. 
However, over the course ofthe last decade a trickle of interesting new interpretations 
have appeared in which this view is, in whole or in part, critically reassessed. One such 
interpretation is offered by Christina Lafont who argues in her book Heidegger, 
Language, and World-Disclosure, against the standard view, that Heidegger was just as 
much a linguistic idealist in Being and Time as he was in his later writings. That is, 
although the text evinces some vacillation between on the one hand, an apparent desire to 
ground language on the primordial phenomenon of discourse, and on the other hand, a 
recognition of language's constitutional power, it is nevertheless clear that Heidegger 
adheres to a linguistic idealist position. Lafont then, for reasons which will be discussed 
below, uses this interpretation to heavily criticize Heidegger. Another reinterpretation, 
much more sympathetic to Heidegger, is offered by Mark Wrathall, who argues in his 
recent book Heidegger and Unconcealment, that Heidegger was never a linguistic 
idealist, and that for the early as well as the late Heidegger, beings are meaningful prior 
to their being named by our ordinary languages. For Wrathall, both "discourse" in Being 
and Time and "language" in Heidegger's later works are best understood as prelinguistic 
phenomena in the sense that in both the earlier and later works, ontic languages rely upon 
either discourse or pre linguistic "language" for their meaningfulness. Yet another 
interesting take on these issues is offered by Taylor Carman, who argues in his 
Heidegger 's Analytic that Heidegger offers a pre linguistic theory of meaning in Being 
and Time. However, he criticizes Wrathall's pragmatic precommunicative 
3 Clear expressions of the standard view are found in Richardson 1993 and Felll979. 
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characterization discourse, charging that it is too far removed from anything resembling 
the communicative aspects of language. Carman also diverges from Wrathall in that he 
agrees with Lafont, and most other Heidegger scholars, that Heidegger's later work is 
shot through with linguistic idealism, making his interpretation a defense of the standard 
v1ew. 
My intention in this paper is to critically assess the merits of these three 
interpretations of the development of Heidegger' s thought from discourse to language. 
The paper will unfold as follows: In the first chapter, I will discuss and critique in turn 
the three aforementioned views ofHeidegger's development. In the second chapter, I will 
turn to an in-depth study of the key passages in Heidegger' s Being and Time which 
constitute the definitive, if often ambiguous, presentation of Heidegger' s early views on 
discourse and language. The third chapter will turn to two important essays from 
Heidegger's later period, namely "Language" and "The Way to Language," in order to 
discern just how radically Heidegger's thinking on these matters changes. Based on this 
research, I will conclude that Wrathall's interpretation ofHeidegger's development is, on 
the large scale, the most accurate and illuminating. However, I will also argue that we 
cannot endorse his position wholesale, for I will follow Carman in holding that pragmatic 
interpreters of Heidegger illicitly downplay the essential role of communication in 
Heidegger' s concept of discourse. This will require us to acknowledge that there is a 
greater gap in meaning between discourse, as presented in Being and Time, and the 
concept of"language" in Heidegger's later works, than Wrathall wishes to allow. 
However, I will also argue that we may still conclude that the two concepts are closer to 
one another than is usually supposed, and that some surprisingly deep connections remain 
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between them in Heidegger' s mature works. I hope to present a view of the evolution 
from discourse to language not as a radical reversal in which Heidegger adopts extreme 
and indefensible views on the power of ordinary languages, but rather as a sustained, 
coherent and penetrating investigation into our relationship with the phenomena of 
meaning and expression. 
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Chapter One: Debating Heidegger's Development 
In this chapter we will attempt to parse the interesting differences that arise in the 
attempt to get at what is really at stake in Heidegger's early discussion of discourse, his 
later discussion of language, and the development from the former to the latter, as well as 
attempt to reach some provisional conclusions regarding the question ofHeidegger's 
alleged linguistic constitutionalism. We will begin with Lafont's view, which may well 
be the most boldly heretical view of Heidegger' s development. 
Lafont's Linguistic Idealist Interpretation 
According to Lafont, a careful reading of Being and Time shows that Heidegger 
was tom between remaining loyal to his philosophical roots in the Platonic philosophies 
of Husserl and Frege, and a new, radical insight into the constitutive nature of ordinary 
languages. This tension, according to Lafont, is responsible for the way that Heidegger 
apparently vacillates between arguing for a foundational relationship between discourse 
and language on the one hand, and a relationship of equivalence on the other. Lafont 
finds traces of the former tendency in many places throughout Being and Time, and 
contends that it first becomes apparent in the "analysis of significance" in § 18, with 
which Heidegger, in an "Husserlian" manner, "attempted to separate terms that already 
seemed inseparable in the analysis of the sign (for the sign as such could only be 
characterized as both ontic and ontological, insofar as its readiness-to-hand consisted 
precisely in showing)" (Lafont 2000, 66). Similarly, according to Lafont, Heidegger also 
attempts to hold discourse and language apart in order to show that the latter is founded 
on the former. However, Lafont regards this is as an invalid conceptual distinction that 
amounts to an attempt to artificially hold apart two distinct yet inseparable aspects of 
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language itself, i.e. language as system of signs and language as discourse. Given the 
apparent artificiality of this distinction, the founding relationship that Heidegger seeks is, 
to put it plainly, nowhere to be found, and Heidegger's claim that "the existential-
ontological foundation of language is discourse" (Heidegger 1962, 203) amounts to 
nothing more than the identification of a methodological difference. 
Lafont also finds problematic Heidegger's attempt to understand discourse both as 
the articulation of the intelligibility of being-in-the-world as well as an essential 
contribution to world-disclosure from Dasein itself, for according to Lafont, this 
articulation is something that can only be carried out, so to speak, by language as a 
system of signs. Heidegger's motivation for holding this view is "a doomed effort to 
conceive the phenomenon of 'articulation' as categorially distinct from language as a 
system of signs" (Lafont 2000, 67). Heidegger, given his Platonic roots, was intent on 
presenting a theory of language that shows its ontological origins on an essential world-
disclosing activity that is unique to Dasein, i.e. an existentiale. As she writes, "Heidegger 
presupposes that in this way the 'world-disclosing' function of language (i.e., the 
resulting 'articulations of intelligibility') could still somehow be traced back to Dasein 
itself' (ibid.). In attempting to show how this works, however, Heidegger takes on an 
impossible task, because "such 'articulation' cannot be considered as a product of 
Dasein" (ibid.). Rather, "Language understood as an 'articulated whole of significance' 
(as a world-disclosing lexicon, so to say) first supplies Dasein with the intelligibility it 
requires in order to be able to express a statement at all" (Lafont 2000, 70). It follows 
from this, according to Lafont, that Dasein's distinctive status is only "borrowed" from 
the holistic meaning structure that is established by the language into which Dasein is 
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thrown. Discourse, therefore, is not a contribution.from Dasein (and thus not an 
existentiale ), but is really just another name for the way that meanings are already there 
for Dasein as a result of its language. 
Lafont regards more favorably the second tendency that she descries in 
Heidegger's discussion of discourse: a tacit recognition of the independently constitutive 
role of ordinary languages, which she considers to be one of Being and Time's genuine 
philosophical advances beyond Husser! and Frege. That is, alongside Heidegger' s attempt 
to draw illicit categorial distinctions between discourse and language, he also begins to 
understand the way in which ordinary languages constitute meaning independently of 
Dasein's activities and practices. This conceptual innovation allows Heidegger to succeed 
in "shattering the Husserlian model of perception" by identifying the "difference between 
the apophantic and the hermeneutic as" (Lafont 2000, 69; emphasis in original).4 
According to Lafont, the recognition of the constitutive nature of ordinary language 
brings to light the dubious practice of understanding the essences of entities primarily as 
present-at-hand objects with determinable properties. Before we grasp objects 
theoretically, they already have been interpreted by language and have, therefore, a 
ready-to-hand, worldly mode of being. Heidegger's insight is that intelligibility was 
always already articulated by one's ordinary language prior to any kind of theoretical 
understanding of entities. 
Lafont argues that this innovation makes plausible a reading of Being and Time 
according to which discourse "is not anything pre linguistic, but rather language itself' 
(Lafont 2000, 70; emphasis in original). According to Lafont, it is only language that can 
4 According to Lafont, this is one respect in which discourse, as Heidegger says, has already been at work 
throughout Being and Time in the run up to §34 (cf. Heidegger 1962, 203). 
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give Dasein the contextual intelligibility that is required for thematic, apophantic 
statements to make sense. For Lafont, this is the only reasonable conclusion to be culled 
from the discussion of discourse in Being and Time, for historical languages are what 
constitute "worlds" in the Heideggerian sense of an encompassing context of 
intelligibility, as intelligible in the first place. Language's mode of being in Being and 
Time should be understood as the ontological "granter of meaning" for all beings and all 
worlds. 
On Lafont's view, however, this conceptual innovation also sows the seeds for the 
ultimate implausibility of the entire project of Being and Time, for as we noted earlier, if 
one recognizes that historical languages are responsible for the articulation of 
intelligibility, one must also affirm that Dasein is not primarily responsible for the 
articulation of intelligibility. Instead, Dasein "borrows" its uniqueness from language, for 
language as a system of signs "alone supplies Dasein with the intelligibility, the 
'understanding of being' that makes up its disclosedness, the understanding from which 
Being and Time took its point of departure" (Lafont 2000, 71). Discourse, as language, is 
thus for Heidegger not an existential, but rather a necessary precondition for there to be 
beings at all, indeed even for there to be Dasein. Dasein's understanding and disposition 
do not constitute meaning, but are rather made possible by the prior meaning granted 
them by language. Thus, 
Precisely because Dasein has the "way of being of something that is thrown and 
depends upon the world," it immediately becomes clear that any separation 
Heidegger might postulate between discourse and language, or between meaning 
and word, is inadmissible (i.e., it could be carried out only from a standpoint 
untouched by the circumstance of being-in-the-world). (Lafont 2000, 72) 
Lafont argues that it follows from this that the project of Being and Time faces a grimly 
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insurmountable systematic obstacle, for Dasein is thrown into a world, and a world 
requires language for its being. Therefore, language is something that cannot be formed 
by way of accruing to the meanings constituted by Dasein's activity ofprelinguistic 
discourse, because language must already be present for Dasein to be at all. According to 
Lafont, it follows that no thrown being, i.e. no being who has as their way of being being-
in-the-world, can make the distinction between discourse and language because there is 
simply no such substantive distinction to be made. For Lafont, to say that language is 
founded on discourse is like saying language is founded on language. In other words, 
according to Lafont Heidegger's foundationalist tendencies lure him into giving Dasein 
credit that is due to language itself. And since this is the case, the concept of Dasein that 
Heidegger attempts to define only "borrows" its distinctive status amongst other entities 
from language. According to Lafont's reading ofHeidegger, entities become meaningful 
things if and only if they are named by an historical language. Language is not a bridge 
between Dasein and things, but is the necessary prerequisite for there to be things at all. 
Thus Heidegger's attempt to establish an ontological foundation for language in Dasein's 
activities fails, for "we are in principle still quite far from any separation between 
meaning and word that might offer a basis for the founding relation that Heidegger 
claims" (Lafont 2000, 73). In other words, for Lafont, Heidegger fails to separate 
meaning and word because words are what establish meanings in the first place. 
Heidegger himself eventually realizes that he will be unable to overcome this tension and 
eventually abandons the attempt to give language a transcendental foundation (in the 
form of discourse as an existentiale, or in any other sense), and forsakes the concept of 
discourse altogether. 5 
5 This claim is not factually true, for, as Wrathall points out, Heidegger reappropriates the term "discourse" 
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Lafont regards Heidegger's later work as a full embrace of the inevitable outcome 
of the tension that had built up in Being and Time between Heidegger' s desire to 
understand language as founded upon discourse, and the constitutional, world-disclosive, 
Dasein-independent nature of language. After the famous turning in his thinking in the 
1930s, Heidegger finally realized that the instrumental conception of language that he 
had inherited from Husserl is not true to the phenomenon he is attempting to describe. 
This abandonment has significant ramifications for, as she writes, "It is this decisive step 
that allows Heidegger to make his definitive break with the supposed distinctive status of 
Dasein, a status resulting from the presupposition that Dasein 'harbors in itself the 
possibility oftranscendental constitution' " (Lafont 2000, 90). According to Lafont, the 
later Heidegger eschews any attempt to make his philosophy transcendental, and makes 
no effort to find a foundation for world-disclosiveness in Dasein itself. 
As Heidegger fleshes out the consequences of an idealistic view of ordinary 
languages, he develops a "meaning determines reference" view of language that was 
already nascent in Being and Time. According to Lafont, for Heidegger, ''the acquisition 
of linguistic knowledge is inextricably interwoven with the 'instituting' of factual 
knowledge" (Lafont 2000, p. 94; emphasis added). 6 Language, in other words, establishes 
what facts are available for us to discover. There are only meaningful things that we can 
encounter insofar as there are words for them. This, Lafont claims, is what Heidegger is 
getting at when he writes in "The Origin of the Work of Art," "language alone brings 
again for a lecture course in the 1950s (c.f. Wrathall2011, 133n8). 
6 Or, as she writes much earlier in the book, "[I]n an even further development [oflinguistic idealism], he 
will declare language to be the court of appeal that (as the "house of being") judges beforehand what can 
be encountered within the world' (Lafont 2000, 7). Or, to show one more example, she argues that for 
Heidegger, "Given the connection [he sketches] between language and world, it is almost a truism that only 
through a word's 'meaning' (as a 'way of givenness') does the referent (as 'given for us') become 
accessible" (Lafont 2000, 94). 
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what is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time," and further, "Only this 
naming nominates beings to their being.from out oftheir being" (Heidegger 2001, 71). 
Lafont interprets all of these remarks as proof that, for Heidegger, "something becomes 
accessible as something only along the path of linguistic conceptualization" (Lafont 
2000, 95), and furthermore, that for Heidegger, there are only things insofar as there is 
word in an ordinary language with which to name them, for it is only by way of being 
thrown into one of these languages that we can encounter beings at all. Thus, according 
to Lafont's interpretation ofthe later Heidegger, just as for her early Heidegger, linguistic 
concepts are what that grant us access to entities as meaningful things. 
Lafont argues that despite the groundbreaking nature of this new understanding of 
language, it once again has dire consequence for the viability ofHeidegger's philosophy, 
for "any attempt to 'objectify' language as an intraworldly entity is excluded by 
Heidegger" (Lafont 2000, 99). That is, language's constitutive and world-disclosive 
nature forecloses any possibility of having a complete grasp of what it is that language is, 
for the universally constitutive nature of language means that we can never trace it back 
to anything else. Lafont argues that Heidegger denies the plausibility of any of the 
traditional attempts to carry out such an exercise, and historical languages are now 
explicitly understood as the origin of the ontological difference in every place where they 
arise. That is, languages provide being or the meaning necessary for human beings to 
encounter beings at all. Although Heidegger states that his goal in the essay "The Way to 
Language" (and presumably the goal of many of his later writings) is to "bring language 
to language as language" (Heidegger 1993, 399), this is in fact a futile task, for "The 
totalizing, holistic, and unthematizable character of this world-disclosing language that in 
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the form of background knowledge is always already shared by us renders vain any 
attempt 'to bring language to language as language' " (Lafont 2000, 1 07). Thus, according 
to Lafont, Heidegger falls prey to the same trap that every adherent of the linguistic turn 
that dominated much 20th century philosophy must, and argues that Dirk Koppelberg's 
critique ofthe limits ofW.V.O. Quine's philosophy oflanguage apply just as well to 
Heidegger's: "[we] cannot make the objects of our philosophical analysis at the same 
time into the instruments of this analysis" (Koppel berg 1987, 117). Heidegger's quest is 
once again doomed to failure, for we can never bring to language the essence of 
language, for language is the medium through which such analyses must be carried out. 
Thus, both Heidegger's early and late discussions oflanguage suffer from a grave 
inconsistency: Heidegger's continued attempt to use language to analyze and express the 
essence oflanguage. 
Critique of the Linguistic Idealist Interpretation 
In Heidegger and Unconcealment, Mark Wrathall has argued forcefully against 
linguistic idealist interpretations of both Being and Time and Heidegger's later works, 
and targets Lafont's position as a particularly forthright and pernicious example of such 
readings. Wrathall notes that Heidegger's famous and oft repeated slogan, "language is 
the house of Being" (Heidegger 1993, 236), is frequently taken as indubitable proof of 
Heidegger's supposed linguistic idealism, and that "[a]lmost everybody acts as if it is 
immediately apparent what Heidegger is trying to say: they take ["language is the house 
of Being"] as a declaration of the view that the being of entities somehow depends on the 
linguistic expressions we use in thinking or talking about those entities" (Wrathall 2011, 
120). Wrathall takes issue with two of Lafont's most radical interpretations ofHeidegger: 
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the first (as we have noted above) is that when Heidegger speaks of"language", he is 
referring to any specific historical language, and the second, that the meaning of 
"language is the house of being" is that a person cannot experience anything for which 
she has no word in her personal linguistic arsenal. As Wrathall notes, according to 
Lafont's view ofHeidegger, "Language is, in American slang, the 'big house' of being: it 
keeps us locked up within its preexisting expressive capacities" (Wrathall2011, 121). 
Against these two claims, Wrathall argues both (a) that "language" does not, at least for 
the later Heidegger, denote ontic, historical languages, and (b) that for Heidegger, both 
early and late, there are meaningful things and experiences that cannot be grasped by 
ordinary languages. 
Wrathall finds evidence that militates heavily against Lafont's first point in the 
following passage from Heidegger's late work entitled "A Dialogue on Language": 
Some time ago I called language, clumsily enough, the house of Being. If man by 
virtue of his language dwells within the claim and call of Being, then we 
Europeans presumably dwell in an entirely different house than Eastasian man. 
(Heidegger 1982, 5) 
From this it is plausible to suggest that when Heidegger refers to "language" in his later 
works, he is not referring to ordinary languages, for he names European language, which 
presumably encompasses German, French, English, etc., and Eastasian language, which 
presumably encompasses Chinese, Japanese, Korean, etc., as the types of"language" he 
is discussing. Lafont might counter that in his passage Heidegger is merely noting that 
European languages are more closely akin to one another than they are with East-Asian 
languages, thus leaving intact her contention that historical languages are the origin of 
meaning for the later Heidegger. However, this seems to beg the question as to the nature 
of the kinship between different European or East-Asian languages. It seems that we can 
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maintain a prelinguistic notion of "language" for the later Heidegger if the kinship results 
in the historical languages arising out of the same or a similar fourfold structure of earth, 
gods, divinities, and mortals. In any case, Wrathall also notes that, in a lecture course on 
Holderlin, Heidegger decries the fact that many of his fellow Germans "indeed speak 
'German,' and yet talk entirely 'American"' (Wrathall2011, 126). As should be quite 
obvious, 'American' is not the linguistic medium through which Heidegger's compatriots 
are literally speaking, but is a language in an ontologically broad sense that is capable of 
being common to and manifesting itself in any number of different ontic languages. 
Furthermore, whatever it is, it is not an ontic totality of words or system of signs. The 
schema that Heidegger is operating with in his later philosophy of language, then, seems 
closer than it initially seems to the one he employs in Being and Time where he 
differentiates historical languages from discourse. 
Wrathall's argument against Lafont's second claim, that Heidegger holds that one 
must have the right linguistic term to be able to experience an entity, is based on a 
critique ofher interpretation ofHeidegger's discussion of Stefan George's poem "The 
Word"7 from his essay "The Nature ofLanguage."8 Wrathall argues that Lafont 
7 Stefan George's "The Word": 
Wonder from far off or a dream 
I brought to my country's border 
And waited until the grey Nom 
Found the name within her wellspring-
Thereupon I could grasp it tightly and strong 
Now it blossoms and shines throughout the 
borderland 
Once I arrived after a good journey 
With a jewel rich and delicate 
14 
erroneously assumes that Heidegger intends for each line of the poem to be understood as 
a proposition that is literally true. Thus, the final line ofthe poem which reads "No thing 
may be where the word is lacking" is taken by Lafont as definitive evidence of 
Heidegger's adherence to linguistic idealism and the thesis that nothing exists for us that 
is not named by a word in an ordinary language. This reading is highly problematic, 
according to Wrathall, for "It takes things as any entity whatsoever. And it takes being in 
the broadest sense possible" (Wrathall2011, 144). A careful reading ofthe passage in 
question shows that this interpretation does not hold under scrutiny. Heidegger writes: 
"Thing" is here understood in the traditional broad sense, as meaning anything 
that in any way is. In this sense even a god is a thing. Only where the word for the 
thing has been found is the thing a thing. Only thus is it. Accordingly we must 
stress as follows: no thing is where the word, that is, the name is lacking. The 
word alone gives being to the thing. Yet how can a mere word accomplish this -
to bring a thing into being? The true situation is obviously the reverse. Take the 
sputnik. This thing, if such it is, is obviously independent of that name which was 
later tacked on to it. (Heidegger 1982, 62; emphasis added) 
The first problem with Lafont's reading is that it commits Heidegger to the belief that 
even a god is a thing, i.e. even a god would rest on the same metaphysical plane as an 
apple, and each would be equally dependent for their meaningfulness on their being 
named in an ordinary language. The suggestion that Heidegger would actually hold such 
a view is highly dubious, especially given the integral role that "gods" play his later 
She searched long and announced to me: 
"No such sleeps here on the deep ground" 
Whereupon it escaped from my hand 
And my country never obtained the treasure 
In this way I sadly learned the renunciation: 
No thing may be where the word is lacking (Quoted in Wrathall2011, 137-38; Wrathall's translation) 
8 Cf. Heidegger 1982, 52-108. 
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philosophy.9 But even if we grant that Heidegger may have indeed affirmed this thesis, 
the second clue weighs even more heavily against Lafont's position: That is, Heidegger 
clearly states that "the true situation is obviously the reverse."10 Heidegger has certainly 
been known to make rhetorical statements that are not meant to be taken literally - see, 
for example, the first six sentences of the passage under examination - but it is hard to 
deny that he means it when he says the situation is obviously the reverse of Lafont's 
interpretation. 11 It seems that Heidegger was entertaining this Lafontian notion not to 
endorse it but to show that this is a poor way to understand George's poem. He even 
gives us a counterexample to Lafont's reading by reminding us that the famous Soviet 
rocket certainly was accessible as something meaningful prior to being named 
"Sputnik."12 Thus, whatever it is that Heidegger wants us to get out of the poem, and 
whatever the relationship between ''things" and "language" that Heidegger wants to draw 
our attention to, Lafont's reading seems to miss the mark. Wrathall's final judgment on 
Lafont's interpretation is a harshly expressed but trenchant summation of the problems 
with the linguistic idealist reading of Heidegger: "It takes no great hermeneutic 
sensitivity to see that Lafont is attributing to Heidegger positions from which he is 
9 See the essay "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" in Poetry, Language, Thought for a good and relatively 
compact discussion of the role of gods in the later Heidegger's ontology of the fourfold. 
10 It is telling that Lafont omits large portions of this passage when she discusses it in Heidegger, Language 
and World Disclosure, including ''the situation is obviously the reverse." 
11 Heidegger even contends on the next page that to affirm a Lafontian reading of George's poem "in truth 
would have thrown everything into utter confusion" (Heidegger 1982, 63). 
12 It might be suggested that Heidegger is attempting to refute not linguistic idealism but rather the 
mistaken interpretation of linguistic idealism that holds words literally bring beings in to existence. Against 
this view, Lafont might counter that language of course does not cause the thing to exist but rather makes it 
accessible to human beings as a meaningful thingly element of a world. I admit that there is enough 
ambiguity in the passage to make this reading plausible, but I maintain that it seems more likely that 
Heidegger is really trying to show how words in ordinary languages do not make beings accessible in their 
thingly nature. I argue that when Heidegger stresses that Sputnik "is obviously independently of that name 
which was later tacked on to it," he means that it this rocket is a fully meaningful thing within a certain 
world prior to being formally named. Indeed, no matter how much I phenomenologically ponder an 
encounter with something like a rocket ship, I cannot conceive of a possible scenario in which it is 
meaningful or accessible to me only if it is given a name. 
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explicitly distancing himself- positions which are 'crude,' which 'throw everything into 
confusion,' and, most importantly, which miss the whole point of the exercise" (Wrathall 
2011, 145n18). 
Wrathall's Pragmatic Interpretation 
Aside from the fact that Wrathall also seeks an holistic understanding of 
Heidegger's thought, his own interpretation of the development from discourse to 
language stands diametrically opposed to Lafont's. That is, according to Wrathall, 
Heidegger at no point held that experience is necessarily constituted by linguistic 
concepts, nor did he ever argue that all possible objects of experience are capable of 
being grasped in purely linguistic terms. Wrathall's contention that the early Heidegger 
was not a linguistic idealist is uncontroversial (though, as my discussion of Lafont shows, 
not undisputed). However, what is unique about his position is his contention that despite 
whatever significant changes come about in Heidegger's understanding of language in his 
later work, these changes do not, as is usually supposed, constitute an embrace of 
linguistic idealism. Wrathall argues instead that "the shift is in large part a change in 
thinking about what the word 'language' names, and thus it cannot be reduced to a simple 
change of view about the role of language in mediating our access to the world or in 
constituting the world" (Wrathall2011, 124). Indeed, according to Wrathall, what 
Heidegger names in his later works with the word "language" is not something that 
linguistic constitutionalists would recognize as language at all, for "[i]n its most 
fundamental form, language for Heidegger is not a conceptual articulation of experience, 
nor is it something that we can say in our ordinary language" (ibid.). And yet, it is 
something with which we are able to have an experience. But what is it, then, that 
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Heidegger is trying to draw our phenomenological gaze towards in his discussions of 
discourse and language? 
Wrathall argues that the shift from discourse to language is not a matter of 
Heidegger changing the focus of his investigations from one entity or region of being to 
another, but instead an attempt to come to a better understanding of the phenomenon he 
denotes with the ancient Greek term logos. This being the case, in making the ''turn" to 
language, Heidegger is not expressing a new found interest in language as we normally 
understand it, as Lafont and others have assumed, but is rather trying a different angle of 
attack for elucidating the phenomenon that he refers to with the name logos. This, of 
course, compels us to inquire into how Heidegger understands this word. Wrathall 
glosses Heidegger's interpretation of logos as "a gathering of meaningful elements into a 
unified structure, a meaningful, but pre linguistic articulation of the world on the basis of 
which entities can be unconcealed and linguistic acts can be performed" (Wrathall2011, 
127, 130; emphasis added). For both the early and later Heidegger, ordinary language, 
according to Wrathall, is dependent on this gathering of meanings into a unified structure 
or articulation of a world, i.e. a thoroughgoing normative space or context of standards by 
which the success or failure of one's carrying out of their understanding of being may be 
adjudicated. Wrathall claims that much of the confusion surrounding these issues stems 
from the fact that when Heidegger "turns" to language in his later work, he is at the same 
time changing what "language" itself denotes, so that it is no longer understood as a 
totality of rule-governed words, as he describes it in Being and Time, but rather the logos 
itself, the "primary meanings" which are "the relationships or involvements that entities 
have with us and other things in a practical situation" (ibid.). 
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According to Wrathall, we can find an everyday example of the logos in 
something as simple as the meaning of a door: it is for going in and out of rooms in a 
building. For Wrathall, this example shows how the structure of the logos is constituted 
by our practical activity, our acts of making sense and understanding. As I will discuss in 
greater detail below, in Heidegger's earlier understanding of language, a word is simply 
something that "accrues" to an already constituted meaning (thus the word "door" 
accrues to the usefulness of the openings allowing us to go in and out of rooms), and as a 
result logos is not dependent on a system of word-signs, but is itself the foundation of all 
systems of signs. The essence of logos is not, according to Wrathall, the totalities of 
words, i.e. the ordinary languages, that express it, but rather its orientation towards ''the 
meaningful world that is capable of being talked about linguistically" (Wrathall2011, 
131 ). Wrathall claims that this interpretation is supported by the following passage on the 
nature of logos from the 1925 lecture course Logic: The Question of Truth: ''what is true 
is not ... the speaking and discussing, but ... that which is said as such, that which is 
sayable and posited in each case and always in the same way ... [what can be expressed; 
the meaning]" (Heidegger 2010, 45). Wrathall argues that this passage indicates an 
important but often overlooked difference between the communicative aspect and the 
articulative aspect of the logos (and by extension of discourse). 
According to Wrathall, the articulative aspect of discourse consists in making the 
referential relations of the world salient, while the communicative aspect consists in 
sharing these relations with others. This difference has been overlooked, according to 
Wrathall, because most commentators have assumed that what is essential in logos is the 
action of saying (communication) rather than what is sayable (the articulated primary 
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meanings). This is understandable, for Heidegger's decidedly sketchy description of 
discourse in Being and Time constantly stresses the communicative dimension of the 
phenomenon. But, in accordance with his interpretation of the passage from the 1925 
lecture, Wrathall argues that "both Sprache [language] as a sign system and Rede 
[discourse] in the communicative sense depend on discourse as meaning articulation" 
(Wrathall2011, 131-132; emphasis added). Wrathall claims that this is evinced by, 
amongst other things, Heidegger's argument in Being and Time that the call of conscience 
is a mode of discourse that is essentially non-communicative. 13 
If all of this holds true, then the change brought about by Heidegger's turn to 
language is far less drastic than is often supposed, for as Wrathall writes, 
In all his works, early and late, Heidegger adheres to some version of the thesis 
that entities are constituted by the relationships they bear to each other. 
Something only is the entity that it is in terms of the way it is referred to and 
aligned with activities and other entities. One might refer to this as a relational 
ontology. (Wrathall2011, 136) 
What is at stake, then, in the turn to language is not a reevaluation of the philosophical 
significance of ordinary language, but a recasting and deepening of the understanding of 
a phenomenon that he had been attending to already in the years leading up to the 
publication of Being and Time, i.e. logos, the way in which entities become meaningful in 
and through their relations to one another. 
13 An interesting issue is the question of why Heidegger made this change from discourse to language in the 
first place. Wrathall suggests that Heidegger abandons Rede in favor of Sprache in an effort to distance 
himself from the Latin origins of Rede. Wrathall does not elaborate on this point further, but it seems to 
suggest that Heidegger shied away from a word associated with Latin because it makes logos and discourse 
seem too closely linked to rationality and the depiction of human beings as essentially rational animals -
the interpretation of human being that Heidegger disputes throughout his philosophical writings both early 
and late. In other words, he does not reject the underlying notion oflogos at all, but rather, he only changes 
his translation to a word more suitable to the phenomenon. As Wrathall writes, "all of these superficially 
inconsistent pronouncements exhibit one consistent, largely stable view about what Heidegger calls the 
'originary meaning' or 'basic meaning' oflanguage" (Wrathall2011, 134). This is nothing other than logos 
itself, i.e. the meaningful gathering and articulation of significations which is essential to the constitution of 
any world whatsoever. 
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Critique of the Pragmatic Understanding of Discourse 
Although Wrathall makes a powerful case for his interpretation, it is also 
susceptible to a convincing criticism, one which is once again succinctly articulated by 
Fell: 
[I]f articulation is inherently prelinguistic, language as the 'expression' of 
articulation will have the task of expressing a ground that is essentially foreign to 
it. In other words, there will be no precedent community of nature between 
language and articulation such that in expressing articulation language would be 
returning to its ownmost locale. (Fell 1979, 199) 
Fell, then, shares Wrathall's interpretation of discourse, under which it is understood as a 
wholly prelinguistic phenomenon. However, he also holds that because discourse is 
prelinguistic, it is thus essentially alien to language, for there is no clear path towards 
showing the founding relationship that might exist between them. According to Fell, this 
results in a situation in which meaning cannot be expressed via language, which thus 
renders language nihilistically empty. Wrathall seems to foresee this objection, and 
attempts to counter it by arguing that the logos, whether in the form of discourse or in the 
saying of language, "enables particular human languages by giving them the salient 
significations to which terms can (but need not) accrue" (Wrathall2011, 154). This is 
not, however, a satisfactory response, for the nature of the "enabling" ability of originary 
language remains unclear. How, precisely, does properly using doors enable the word 
"door" (or die Tiir, la puerta, or la porte, for that matter) to accrue to a meaning and 
enable interpersonal communication? Wrathall admits that as it stands, his account of the 
tie between discourse (as he construes it) and language is tenuous, stating that "we ... 
need to work out with more care the relationship between ordinary language and 
originary language" but also that this is "a task to be deferred" (Wrathall2011, 155). 
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Rather than deferring this task, however, I argue that Taylor Carman has provided an 
interpretation of discourse that articulates the relationship between discourse and 
language in such a way that discourse is, pace Wrathall, prelinguistic, but also, against 
Fell, closely linked to language. Carman shares Fell's worries about the kind ofwholly 
precommunicative interpretation of discourse that we find in Wrathall, but with the 
important caveat that he does impute this interpretation to Heidegger himself, but rather 
to a mistaken understanding of discourse that underemphasizes its essentially 
communicative dimension. 
Carman argues that pragmatic interpreters of Heidegger misconstrue discourse by 
"divorcing the concept ... from anything even remotely tied to gesture, expression, or 
communication" (Carman 2003, 204), and thus rendering the concept unduly solipsistic. 
William Blattner's argument in his Heidegger's Temporal Idealism that a person walking 
down the sidewalk is engaged in discourse is paradigmatic of such misreadings. In this 
example, Blattner argues that by simply walking down a sidewalk, one is engaged in 
discourse because she is showing that the proper use for sidewalks is for walking on, and 
thus articulating their intelligibility. 14 Blattner even goes so far as to insist that such 
activities are genuinely communicative, even if they are carried out in complete isolation. 
Not only is this a strange way to understand something called "discourse", but it also 
leaves little room for differentiating it from Dasein's way of practical understanding, i.e. 
interpretation as demonstrative practice, and therefore robbing discourse of the special 
role it is meant to play in world disclosure. If Blattner's example should be criticized for 
stretching the meaning of"communication" much too far, Wrathall's should be praised 
14 One can easily imagine that he would raise similar objections to Wrathall's example of the practical use 
of doors in a building. 
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for admitting that such activities are precommunicative. This, however, does not save it 
from the charge that it still does not give us an accurate representation of what Heidegger 
means by "discourse." 
Carman traces the tendency of pragmatic interpreters to construe discourse as 
non-communicative to John Haugeland's translation ofHeidegger's original German 
term Rede as ''telling" in the sense of telling the time or apprehending the situation in a 
game of chess. Hauge land writes, "Though Heidegger does not make this explicit, we 
may surmise that concrete being amidst is reflected in telling what the current position is, 
the world in telling what a rook or a threat is, and the who in the sharing and 
communicating" (Haugeland 1989, 65). For Haugeland, Rede as telling is a way of 
responding to differences, and thus has no necessary connection to language. He admits 
that ''there is almost no basis for [this interpretation] in the text], but maintains that this is 
Heidegger's position because it accounts for certain apparent vacillations later in Being 
and Time and also "would connect telling directly with norms" (Haugeland 1989, 65-66). 
Haugeland, then, advocates this position not because it is strongly grounded in what 
Heidegger actually says, but because it is amenable to a consistent understanding of the 
whole of Being and Time. 15 Beyond the fact that this interpretation is not solidly 
grounded in the text, it also forces one to affirm the dubious conclusion that "[ e ]ven in 
our most private or solitary moments, we are constantly discoursing, just by skillfully 
differentiating the equipment we use and the tasks we pursue" (Carman 2003, 228). For 
Carman, the inadequacy of this account lies in its failure to do justice to the essentially 
communicative nature of discourse that Heidegger stresses numerous times in his 
15 Haugeland's desire to connect discourse with Dasein's normative orientation is laudable, but, as we will 
attempt to show below, his account stresses the wrong kind of norms. 
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discussion of the concept, for one stretches the notion of communication too strenuously 
when one countenances thoroughly solipsistic activities like differentiating between kinds 
of screws or between proper and improper places to walk as communicative. Some of the 
pragmatic interpreters of Heidegger have attempted to avoid this conclusion by holding 
that each and every one of our actions contain an element of reflexive normative 
endorsement and expression, but against this Carman counters that "even if I typically 
understand what I do as normal and proper, it does not follow that what I do includes as 
part of its own intelligibility an expression or communication of its normality or propriety 
... "(Carman 2003, 231 ). Attempts to ascribe a dimension of communication or 
expression to these solitary acts are, according to Carman, merely tacked on by the 
pragmatists, and, as such, they fail to provide an accurate description of the phenomenon. 
The other major problem with the pragmatic interpretation of discourse is that it is 
"in danger of letting [discourse] collapse ... into Heidegger's practical conception of 
understanding" (ibid.). According to Carman, "The projective character of understanding 
is surely what allows us to differentiate the meaningful elements of the referential context 
of significance and thus 'tell' one thing from another" and, as such, "discourse must be 
something more than actualizing significations just by coping with them or in light of 
them" (Carman 2003, 232). It follows from this that the pragmatic account is unable to 
account for discourse's articulative nature, for it must assume that intelligibility has 
already been articulated. According to Carman, "Discourse does not presuppose the 
articulation of intelligibility; it is the articulation of intelligibility" (ibid.). The error 
committed by the pragmatists is that, in their desperation to avoid linguistic idealism, 
they go too far the other direction and try to argue that everything we do can be 
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understood as discoursing. Carman acknowledges that ''just as Dasein always has some 
mood and some understanding, so too we are in a sense always 'in' discourse" (ibid.). 
However, he adds, ''the primordiality of an existential structure does not imply that that 
structure will be made manifest and obvious in any and every concrete case we imagine, 
as we imagine it" and cites the example of a dreamlessly sleeping person as one who may 
well not be exhibiting any of the features of world-disclosure: "The sleeping person, if he 
is Dasein, will indeed be an attuned, understanding, discursive agent. But we will not be 
able to appreciate those aspects of his existence simply by imagining him prostrate and 
unconscious" (ibid.). To truly get at what Heidegger means by "discourse" we must look 
to examples in which we stand in explicit discursive relations with others. 
The Primacy of Communication 
Carman provisionally defines discourse as the "expressive-communicative 
dimension of practice, broadly conceived, [with] language being just one of its concrete 
manifestations" (Carman 2003, 205). Discourse, then, constitutes a public space that 
allows for different expressive possibilities that is always anchored to a specific, ontic 
location. Discourse, Carman argues, is unique in that it adds to the structure of 
intelligibility a kind of meaning that is as important as, but not identical to, practical 
significance. Thus, discourse is 
the way in which our world is coherently articulated, not just pragmatically or 
teleologically in terms of ends or activities, but expressively and 
communicatively, that is, in terms of how it makes sense to express our 
understanding and convey it to others, and indeed to ourselves" (Carman 2003, 
206). 
For Carman, then, and contra Wrathall, the pragmatic and teleological elements of 
worldhood belong firmly with understanding and interpretation, while discourse accounts 
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for the way in which we constantly express and communicate our understanding to others 
and ourselves. Not only do we live in a world that is practically coherent, but one which 
is also essentially open to being expressed and shared with others. Carman thus denies 
Wrathall's contention that discourse is a two-layered concept, with the meaning 
articulating aspect serving as the foundation of the communicative aspect. The pragmatic 
interpreters of Being and Time have overlooked this fact, and understandably so, for we 
are always, so long as we are Dasein, also purposefully and understandingly engaging 
with the world, and understanding and discourse are thus closely intertwined. 
Carman argues that a more accurate interpretation of discourse emerges when we 
bring the concept closer to something resembling language in its communicative, 
grammatical, and illocutionary dimensions. In so doing, one is able to understand the way 
in which discourse and language are essentially linked without collapsing one into the 
other, and also avoid a redundant conception of discourse, whose influence on world 
constitution is already explained by Heidegger's concept of interpretation. Under 
Carman's interpretation, discourse is linked to the norms that govern showing and saying. 
The norms that govern showing and saying are "specific to interpretation, governing the 
intelligibility of demonstrative practices as such" and, for Carman, this "is what 
Heidegger means by 'discourse'" (Carman 2003, 235). Discourse, then, has a close 
relationship with interpretation, but cannot be identified with it. If through interpretation 
we learn how to understand something as what it is, then it is through discourse that we 
first gain access to things as meaningful in the first place. This fits nicely with many of 
the examples of discourse that Heidegger actually discusses in §34 of Being and Time, 
such as assenting, refusing, following, and challenging. Discourse is not simply that the 
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world fits together in an intelligible manner, but is rather "the susceptibility of that 
pragmatic structure to meaningful and appropriate interpretation, which is to say 
expression" (Carman 2003, 236). The concept of discourse is not merely intended to 
highlight how things are intelligible but that they are communicable. Pragmatic 
interpreters have overlooked the fact that just as there are norms governing the pragmatic 
elements of our existence, so also are there norms that govern the proper ways by which 
we may express our understanding of existence. As Carman writes, "There are purely 
discursive norms governing the expression of intelligibility, that is, just as there are 
purely pragmatic norms governing our purposive activity at large" (ibid.). And discourse 
is ubiquitous not because it encompasses both kinds of intelligibility, but because just as 
there is a normative element to the way we engage in our lives in an intelligible context, 
so also is there a normative element to the way in which this intelligibility is open to 
being made explicit to ourselves and to others. Just as there is a proper way to be a 
carpenter, so also are there proper ways in which to talk about being a carpenter. The 
intelligibility of our practical understanding goes hand in hand with the expressability of 
this understanding. 
While Carman is quite astute in his exposition of the meaning and importance of 
the concept of discourse for Being and Time, he very quickly, and, as I will argue, 
erroneously, endorses the part of the standard view that contends that Heidegger becomes 
a linguistic constitutionalist in his later work. Without providing any argumentation in 
support of the claim, Carman declares that "Heidegger settled unequivocally on a 
constitutive conception of language in his later writings, at least by the mid-1930s" 
(Carman 2003, 222). There are many reasons to be skeptical of this claim, despite how 
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well entrenched it is, and we will explore how we might understand the development of 
Heidegger's interpretation of logos differently below. 16 However, before we do this we 
will turn now to Being and Time in order to see how well these interpretations of the 
concept of discourse fare in light of Heidegger says there. 
16 Carman probably should not be chastised too harshly for not spending a lot of time explaining why we 
should read the later Heidegger's work as a kind linguistic idealist philosophy because a) most interpreters 
ofHeidegger assume that this is the case, and b) Heidegger's Analytic is a book about the early Heidegger, 
and such a discussion would therefore have been a distraction. This, however, does not change the fact that 
his view of the development is wrong. 
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Chapter Two: Discourse and Language in Being and Time 
We turn now to an investigation into how well these interpretations of 
Heidegger's concepts of discourse and language map onto what Heidegger actually says 
about them. Our next step is thus to determine whether discourse is merely another name 
for language, whether it is entirely prelinguistic and precommunicative, or whether it is 
both prelinguistic as well as communicative. Our next major project is, then, an 
examination ofHeidegger's discussions of logos, discourse, and language in Being and 
Time. Just before that, however, I think it necessary to present a brief excursus on two 
Heideggerian concepts to which discourse is intimately related: disposition and 
understanding. 
The Other Existentiale: Disposition and Understanding 
Before launching into an in-depth discussion of the concept of discourse, it will be 
useful to briefly review the two other concepts that, according to the early Heidegger, 
accompany it in making up the essential structure of our way openness to the world. 
Worlds, if they are understood with Heidegger as totalities of significance, are disclosed 
through the intertwined working of these three ontological elements, or existentiale. This 
will be helpful not only to show how discourse fits into the overall project Heidegger is 
attempting to carry out in Being and Time, but will also shed light on some of Carman's 
criticisms of the pragmatic interpretation of discourse. 
Disposition.17 One of the essential features of our being-in-the-world is the fact 
that we always find ourselves with disposition towards the world. Disposition is 
17 "Disposition" is one of several possible translations for Heidegger's term "Befindlichkeit." I have chosen 
this translation over Macquarrie and Robinson's rendering of Befindlichkeit as "state-of-mind" in order to 
avoid the "mentalistic" or consciousness-laden connotations attached to it. Other possible translations are 
"attunement" and "affectivity." 
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Heidegger's concept for the fact that one's mood makes it such that things matter to her 
in a certain way. According to Heidegger, "[moods make] manifest 'how one is, and how 
one is faring'. In this 'how one is', having a mood brings Being to its 'there"' (Heidegger 
1962, 173). Our disposition is thus, in a sense, the existential "site" of our lives. As such, 
the condition of having a disposition is not something that we can avoid. Rather, we are 
all always already thrown into one disposition or another. The fact that we are always in 
some mood or another, that the world and the things within it always matter to us in a 
certain manner, is disclosive of the fact that we are "thrown." This means that we are 
always delivered over to a certain situation or context. Furthermore, "The way in which 
the mood discloses is not one in which we look at thrownness, but one in which we turn 
towards or turn away" (Heidegger 1962, 17 4 ). What Heidegger means by this, is that 
moods do not disclose themselves, per se, but rather they disclose the things we 
encounter in the world in a certain way. Mood essentially influences the way in which 
things matter to us. A good example of this is how, when one is full of fear, normally 
mundane sounds or images can instill shock and fright, or how when someone is 
engrossed in work, carpentry for example, the fact that their feet are becoming covered in 
sawdust is a non-issue - it does not matter at all. Thus, dispositions are not simply 
annoying and temporary events that distort the true way in which the world is in itself. As 
Heidegger writes, "[moods have] already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as 
a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something" 
(Heidegger 1962, 176; italics omitted). In other words, we only direct ourselves towards 
things that matter to us in one way or another. "Existentially, a [disposition] implies a 
disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters 
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to us" (Heidegger 1962, 177; italics omitted). Steven Crowell nicely sums up the 
significance of disposition thusly: "Moods are not subjective colorations laid over an 
objectively given world; they are essential constituents of meaning, and without them 
nothing in the world could make a claim on me" (Crowell2001, 213). 
Understanding. The second primordial element ofDasein's world-disclosure is, 
according to Heidegger, understanding. As Heidegger writes, "A [disposition] always has 
its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its 
mood" (Heidegger 1962, 182). But what, then, is understanding? Heidegger seeks to 
describe an unusual conception of understanding which, he claims, underlies the 
traditional, Kantian conception, according to which it is considered to be just one form of 
cognition alongside others, such as explaining or reasoning. According to Heidegger, 
these are both derivative "of that primary understanding which is one of the constituents 
of the Being of the 'there' in general" (ibid.). This is, of course, only a negative 
characterization of understanding, and perhaps a highly contentious one at that. 
Positively, Heidegger characterizes understanding as an "ability-to-be" (Seink6nnen). As 
Heidegger writes, "In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have ... 
competence over is not a 'what', but Being as existing" (Heidegger 1962, 183). What 
Heidegger means_ by this is, roughly, that all of our ways cognizing the world are rooted 
in a certain primordial understanding of the world that is built up around a certain way of 
being that we each have taken over. Primordial understanding is, for Heidegger, not 
understanding of this or that particular item, but rather an ability to exist in a certain way. 
For example, before I can understand a band saw as a band saw, I must be the kind of 
person who understands band saws as ready-to-hand things within my world. An 
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engineer may well be able to acquire a technical grasp of band saws by taking them apart 
and analyzing its various parts, but without possessing the skillful means by which I can 
manipulate the saw as a carpenter does, I cannot hope to understand it in Heidegger's 
sense. Ontologically, we are beings whose understanding is fundamentally shaped by the 
way in which we each skillfully handle and interact with a significant world. The 
technical understanding of a band saw only makes sense within the context of a prior 
understanding of oneself as someone for whom building things with wood is significant. 
As Steven Crowell notes, understanding is, for Heidegger, "that know-how whereby I 
negotiate my everyday affairs" (Crowell2001, 213). 
The way in which we understand the world is made manifest in the different 
interpretations we form based on our understanding. We interpret things by acting in a 
certain way, that is, we act according to the "as-structure" of the world in the significance 
it has according to our own understanding of it. This phenomenon encompasses such 
diverse examples as the way a gardener treats certain kinds of plants as weeds by 
uprooting them so that they will not harm the plants she is trying to cultivate, or the way 
that a black bloc anarchist treats the front window of a Starbuck's coffee shop as a 
glaring symbol of corporate oppression by hurling a garbage can through it. Thus, 
interpretation does not ''throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present at 
hand" but rather "when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in 
question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the 
world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation" (Heidegger 
1962, 190-191 ). Interpretation, then, is the disclosure of a thing or a meaning as it stands 
within the context of a certain understanding and disposition. Through interpretation, 
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something is grasped in the particular way in which we understand it, or in what 
Heidegger calls its "fore-conception" (ibid). The significance of something is brought 
forward from out of its context in our understanding. 
From this it seems that Carman's claim that the pragmatic interpretation of 
discourse is dangerously close to collapsing into understanding as interpretation is sound, 
for if we understand discourse as a phenomenon that shows itself primarily in examples 
like properly using doors, or telling the difference between different kinds of nails or 
screws, there seems little room for a meaningful role for interpretation in the structure of 
Being and Time. In other words, the examples of discourse that are cited by Wrathall and 
the other pragmatic interpreters of Being and Time are well accounted for by the way that 
understanding manifests itself through interpretation. It is indeed possible that Heidegger 
himself confused and blurred the distinction between these two essential elements of our 
world-disclosure, but in order to adjudicate this possibility, we must now at last turn to a 
thorough examination of Heidegger' s discussion of discourse itself. 
On §7 B. of Being and Time: The Concept of Logos 
Before turning to §34 of Being and Time, where Heidegger gives his fullest 
account of discourse, it will be useful to review what he says about it in the Introduction, 
in which he links discourse with the ancient Greek concept of logos. 18 According to 
Heidegger, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, the true nature of logos been covered up 
by subsequent interpretations that have understood the concept to mean reason, judgment, 
concept, definition, ground, and relationship. None of these, claims Heidegger, allows us 
to see the phenomenon in question. In an attempt to rectify our impoverished 
18 This connection is especially important for our purposes, since, as we discussed above, Wrathall argues 
that both 'discourse' for the early Heidegger and 'language' for the later Heidegger are translations of 
logos. 
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understanding, Heidegger claims that the essence of the concept can be drawn out by 
attending to the phenomenon of discourse (Rede). Heidegger argues that "logos as 
'discourse' means ... to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse" 
(Heidegger 1962, 56). Thus, in this provisional definition, discourse means to make clear, 
apparent, or to point out what is at issue. Heidegger continues to argue that discourse 
makes manifest what is being talked about either for the one who is discoursing or for the 
one(s) with whom one is talking. Heidegger, then, leaves open the possibility that 
discourse need not be carried out directly with others, and this, admittedly, seems to lend 
some support to the possibility of the kind of solipsistic interpretation of discourse that is 
defended by the pragmatist interpreters. We will argue that this need not necessarily be 
the case below, but for now we merely note it and move on. 
Heidegger writes, "In discourse, so far as it is genuine, what is said [was geredet 
ist] is drawn.from what is talked about, so that discursive communication, in what it says 
[in ihrem Gesagten], makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this 
accessible to the other party" (Heidegger 1962, 56). Although the meaning ofthis 
sentence is not entirely clear, it seems to indicate that discourse is a way of making 
meanings accessible or graspable to another. Discourse is shedding light on, or drawing 
out into the open, a meaning that is already, in some sense, at play or at hand, or one 
which I already have some understanding of and disposition towards. In its most concrete 
form, "discoursing (letting something be seen) has the character of speaking [Sprechens] 
-vocal proclamation in words" (ibid.). Discourse is, then, not just speaking or language, 
for these are only the most concrete forms that discourse takes. It lets something be seen 
as something - but what does this mean? It appears to mean that it is shown how it is 
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integrated in a context of meaning - perhaps in the sense of advancing a new 
understanding of something, or affirming the present understanding of it. As Heidegger 
writes, discourse is "letting something be seen in its togetherness [Beisammen] with 
something - letting it be seen as something" (ibid.). It is a way in which the things that 
make up our worlds become "unbidden" from their already meaningful but secret "life" 
that we do not normally notice. 
The pragmatic approach to discourse is not necessarily ruled out by any of what 
we have just discussed, and, as we have seen above, Wrathall and others go to great 
lengths to argue that the meaningful elements that make up a world are brought to 
salience both primarily and most of the time via precommunicative means, such as using 
doors, sidewalks, and differentiating screws. However, this interpretation is already 
rendered problematic by Heidegger's constant references to communication and the 
practice of making meanings manifest to other parties. These hints may, of course, be 
obviated by the possibility, which Heidegger opens up early on in this section, that 
discourse need not be carried out exclusively between multiple parties, for discourse can 
be a way in which Dasein makes sense of something/or itself. Lafont's view, on the other 
hand, does not seem well supported by any ofHeidegger's discussion of logos and 
discourse in §7, though this is also not necessarily damaging to her position, given her 
insistence that Heidegger waffles back and forth between a superficial attempt to ground 
language in something prelinguistic and his secret insight that language cannot in fact be 
founded on anything. With these thoughts fresh in our mind, let us tum to §34 of Being 
and Time, in which Heidegger gives his official account of discourse. 
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On §34 of Being and Time: Discourse and Language 
Heidegger claims in Being and Time that language is an ontic phenomenon that is 
rooted in a more primordial element ofDasein's disclosedness. More plainly stated, 
Heidegger is attempting to show that language is founded upon something ontological, 
i.e. something that is general, or essential to the constitution of meaningful worlds. He 
writes, "The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk" 
(Heidegger 1962, 203). Thus language, as Heidegger understands it in Being and Time, is 
not a primordial phenomenon, but is instead rooted in discourse. Discourse, on the other 
hand, as the third fundamental existentiale of Dasein, is existentially primordial with 
disposition and understanding. The role that it plays in the constitution of worldhood is 
not entirely clear, however, and Heidegger's discussion is cryptic and feels 
underdeveloped, and contains some seemingly incompatible assertions.19 As a result, 
making sense of it and attempting to develop a unified and coherent interpretation from 
these pages is quite difficult, and this is surely a contributes to the fact that there are such 
wildly varying interpretations of the concept. 
Heidegger writes that the "intelligibility of something has always been articulated, 
even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of 
intelligibility" (Heidegger 1962, 203-4). By this Heidegger means that even before we 
engage with the world through our dispositions and our understanding interpretations, the 
meanings we encounter have already been in some way articulated by discourse. Our 
everyday coping with the world through, for example, successfully using sidewalks, 
19 Heidegger acknowledges that such is indeed the case in his late work "A Dialogue on Language" 
wherein he writes, regarding his discussion of discourse and language in Being and Time: "The 
fundamental flaw of the book Being and Time is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early" (Heidegger 
1982, 7). 
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yielding seats to the elderly on subway trains, or scheduling meetings with colleagues is 
already preceded by these things being shown to us as meaningful or "at stake" through 
communicative discourse. A Lafontian interpretation of this passage would entail that it 
is language that has always already provided the articulated meanings that we navigate 
our way through in our everyday activities. Insofar as we hold, with Heidegger, that 
language is a mode of discourse, we cannot deny that language plays an important role in 
this articulation. But this does not quite get at what Heidegger is drawing our attention 
towards, because he seems to have in mind something more active than this. It is rather 
by talking with people, conversing with them, or engaging with them in some truly 
communicative sense that we begin to learn what is important, what is at issue, etc. 
What is articulated through discourse is, according to Heidegger, meaning. 
Meaning, for Heidegger, is "[t]hat which gets articulated as such in discursive 
Articulation" and which "we call the 'totality-of-significations' [Bedeutungsganze]" 
(Heidegger 1962, 204). There are two important points to emphasize here: the first is that 
Heidegger clearly regards meaning as something that is articulated through discursive 
activity. This points to the crucial difference between the two kinds of articulation that 
Heidegger discusses in Being and Time: the articulation carried out by the interpretation 
of one's understanding and the more primordial articulation of intelligibility that is 
carried out through discursive discourse. Interpretation, as we discussed above, is the way 
in which we understand the various things we encounter as what they are under a certain 
understanding or ability to be (such as the way the carpenter articulates the band saw as a 
band saw through its use). But onto logically prior to this kind of articulation is the way in 
which discourse articulates the band saw as meaningful in the first place. By this, I argue, 
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Heidegger is simply pointing out that we learn that something is meaningful by way of 
communication. Through communication the apprentice carpenter learns the reasons why 
band saws are significant elements in the world of the carpenter. Meaning and 
intelligibility are not solopsistically articulated through private activities but rather 
discursively or communicatively. The meanings of the worlds into which we are thrown 
are made explicit and accessible to us as meanings through the communicative activity 
discourse. In conversance with one another (construed broadly enough to include both 
linguistic and prelinguistic expression), we discover that things are meaningful and 
important; it is this communicative practice that first opens up to us the various 
possibilities that we can take over and make our own. The second point is that meaning is 
a totality of significations. This means that meaning is not something that is simply 
bestowed on individual items that would be what they are independently of their contexts. 
Rather, meaning is the world, the encompassing meaning-structure that allows various 
individual items to show up as meaningful in the first place. This being the case, 
individual meanings only make sense within a worldly context. Discourse is a worldly, 
world-disclosing phenomenon because it articulates the different significations which 
make up the structure of a world. Discourse as the articulation of intelligibility is the part 
of our world-disclosure that makes various individual meanings salient for the first time. 
That is, it draws meanings out of their enmeshment in the incredibly complex weft of 
meaning that is constituted through our dispositions and understandings, and in some way 
grants that meaning its proper distinction from other significances. 
It is at this point that Heidegger gives us his first hint as to how, in his philosophy, 
discourse relates to language. He writes, "The totality-of-significations of intelligibility is 
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put into words. To significations, words accrue. But word-Things do not get supplied 
with significations" (ibid.; emphasis added). Language, then, is a way in which the 
meanings that have already been articulated by discourse are expressed. Words "accrue" 
to meanings that have already been made salient through of discourse. The function of 
word-things seems to be a way to make meanings generally accessible to the speakers of 
a particular language. What accrual is for Heidegger is not made especially clear beyond 
his note that it should not be understood as the supplying of significations. Instead, 
Heidegger seems to argue that words become "organically" associated with meanings. 
That is to say, the accrual of words to meanings is not a 'conscious' or 'mentalistic' 
process, but a natural outgrowth of our tendency to systematize and generalize the 
meanings that make up our worlds. Language, it seems, is the furthest step along the way 
of the evolution of discourse. Heidegger explains the significance of language further 
when he writes, "Language is a totality of words - a totality in which discourse has a 
'worldly' Being of its own' and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes 
something which we may come across as ready-to-hand" (ibid.). Language is thus, for the 
early Heidegger, an intraworldly entity with the being of something ready-to-hand, which 
means is that language is a kind of tool that we can grasp and use skillfully, just as we 
might use a sidewalk, hammer, or computer. 
So far all of this seems to fit in well with a prelinguistic, yet communicative, 
interpretation of discourse. However, we cannot ignore some passages that seem to 
vexingly resist our interpretation. For example, Heidegger argues that discourse "is 
existentially language" (ibid.), a statement which obviously lends support to a linguistic 
idealist reading of Being and Time. One might argue, with the linguistic idealists, that 
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Heidegger is admitting that there is no more than a methodological distinction between 
discourse and language, and that discourse is simply an aspect of language. I think, 
however, that there is room for an alternate interpretation. Right before he declares that 
discourse is existentially language Heidegger argues that "discourse gets expressed as 
language" and that "[l]anguage is a totality of words- a totality in which discourse has a 
'worldly' Being of its own" (ibid.; emphasis added). This is key, because, I argue, by 
saying that discourse is existentially language, Heidegger is pointing out that language is 
the meaningful element through which discourse manifests itself as a worldly entity. If 
language, as Heidegger understands it in Being and Time, is a medium through which 
meanings are explicitly expressed, then discourse is existentially language in that it the 
existential foundation of all such kinds of communicative expression. Discourse, we 
might argue, is existential communication. That is to say, discourse also raises 
significations into salience via discursive means (i.e. through proto-argumentative, reason 
giving, or explanatory activity, such as assenting, refusing, going along with, etc.), but it 
need not rely upon the words and symbols that are paradigmatic for language as it is 
normally understood. Thus, there will indeed be an essential relation between discourse 
and language, but it does not follow that discourse is language - or at least we need not 
draw this conclusion from this particular passage. 
Lending further credibility to the communicative interpretation of discourse 
Heidegger goes on to argue that it is essentially connected to Dasein's social nature. He 
begins his argument by again noting that discourse articulates significantly our being-in-
the-world. This is nothing new, but when we unpack what being-in-the-world means, we 
discover an essential link to sociality, for as Heidegger reminds us, "Being-with belongs 
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to Being-in-the-world, which in every case maintains itself in some definite way of 
concemful Being-with-one-another'' (ibid.). Thus, discourse is always, in some fashion, 
disclosive of our sociality, for as beings whose way of being is essentially being-in-the-
world, we are essentially social. A world, for Heidegger, is not something constituted by 
lone subjects, but by and through relations between human beings and their surrounding 
environments. The entities that we encounter claim us in the way that they do as a result 
ofintersubjective constitution and thus the articulation ofthese meaningful entities is also 
an intersubjective phenomenon. The communicative practice of discourse helps us make 
distinctions, assign things their proper place, and understand and even debate about what 
entities are for us. Heidegger continues, "Such Being-with-one-another is discursive as 
assenting or refusing, as demanding or warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or 
interceding, as 'making assertions', and as talking in the way of'giving a talk',, (ibid.). 
The way in which meanings are put at stake is essentially through our discursive and 
communicative being-with. Existential communication is the way in which Dasein makes 
a shared world explicit. To be, for Heidegger, is to be in a socially constituted world of 
intelligibility and significance, and we discover this and make it salient by way of our 
discoursing with each other?0 
We still need to become clearer about how discourse is carried out, how broadly 
we can understand it, and in what sense is it "communicative.', Heidegger tells us that 
discourse is always discoursing about something about which we already have some kind 
of understanding, but which has not yet necessarily been grasped theoretically. This being 
the case, is discourse then to be understood as a process of making scientific propositions 
20 And, as the discussion of conscience in Division II of Being and Time shows us, by way of discoursing 
with ourselves. 
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about these things? Heidegger rejects this characterization, for the formation of verifiable 
propositions is, for Heidegger, a highly specialized and abstract step beyond what 
normally constitutes discourse. But what, then, is discourse, if not primarily this? The 
answer seems to be that discourse is a dialogical, communicative "talking" about things 
in their significance for us and for our world. Heidegger gives us a clue as to how 
discourse manifests itself when he writes, "That which the discourse is about [ das 
Woruber der Rede] does not necessarily or even for the most part serve as the theme for 
an assertion in which one gives something a definite character" (Heidegger 1962, pp. 
204-5). Thus discourse and communication are, for Heidegger, not primarily 
characterized by making assertions or propositions about the nature of things, but are 
rather carried out in a "quieter" kind ofbackground activity wherein we communicatively 
make sense of a world, often without even consciously realizing it. 
Assenting might be a prime example of this kind of communication, for we can 
indicate our assent in a matter without even actually "saying" anything with language, but 
rather indicating our agreement with a nod of the head or a barely perceptible hand 
signal. For example, I can silently assent to my bartender's suggestion that I not drink 
anymore this evening by paying my tab and leaving the bar, and thus express agreement 
with her that it is good not to overdrink and cause damage to my health or the health of 
others, and thus the bartender and I bring into salience the meanings of drunkenness, 
sobriety, and the proper balance to strike between the two. But despite the fact that the 
things we discourse about are usually not brought into salience through assertion, there is 
always something which the discourse is indeed about, for what the discourse is about is 
an essential structural element of being-in-the-world. As Heidegger writes, "In any talk or 
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discourse, there is something said-in-the-talk as such [ ein Geredetes as solches] -
something said as such [ das ... Gesagte als solches] whenever one wishes, asks, or 
expresses oneself about something. In this 'something said', discourse communicates" 
(Heidegger 1962, 205). Something, some meaning, is always at stake in our discursive 
relations with one another, whether it be sobriety, health, drunkenness, Dionysian revelry, 
or any other. By discoursing about something we are constituting our world in that we are 
dealing with some single or several structural elements of our world through challenging 
them, affirming them, or even expressing disdain or disinterest in them. Discourse as a 
communicative phenomenon is not the transference of information from one soul or brain 
to another, but rather a discursive "putting-at-stake" of, or expression of what is at issue 
with some element (or elements) of a shared world of significance. The true sense of 
communication is world-disclosure itself. 
This is a crucial point for Heidegger, for, I argue, he is attempting to radically 
reinterpret the nature of communication, which (at least according to Heidegger in 1927) 
is typically understood as the making of assertions for the purpose of the transference of 
information from the inside of one subject to the inside of another subject. However, for 
Heidegger, in existential communication, "the Articulation of Being with one another 
understandingly gets constituted" (ibid.). One consequence of this is that a shared 
disposition towards the world becomes constituted. This means that we who share a 
world share a way in which certain things matter to us in various situations, such as when 
one becomes angry when someone talks loudly on a cell phone one table over a nice 
restaurant, a meaning that we may articulate through passive-aggressive harrumphing, 
politely asking the person to take it outside, or pitching the offending phone into the 
43 
lobster tank. 
A shared understanding is also developed with one another through 
communication, for through it we understand ourselves, for example, as fans of football 
or Pink Floyd. This is because it is communicative discourse with one another that opens 
us to what is at issue with professional sports, rock music, or anything else that is 
meaningful. Things that are meaningful and life-projects that deal with them, are always 
constituted within the context of a shared world. The norms for success or failure at being 
a football or rock fan (or a football player or rock musician) always run before us. It is in 
this way that discourse is equiprimordial with the other existentiale, for discourse makes 
dispositions and abilities-to-be available to us as meaningful - as things worthy of 
appropriating for ourselves. As Heidegger writes, Being-with "is already, but it is 
unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated" (ibid.). 
Discourse is, then, an expression of the normative dimension to things. That is, discourse 
is the way in which we express that something is right, fitting, or suitable (or for that 
matter, wrong, ill-fitting, or unsuitable). As Carman argues, discourse accounts for the 
way that meanings are amenable to being shared with one another. It is not like a file 
being transferred from one computer to another, but a way in which we say that we fmd 
some element or elements of our world-structure to be, to put it simply, good or bad, or 
even meaningless and thus not part of our shared world at all. 
Heidegger claims that there are four essential elements that constitute any 
instance of discourse: "what the discourse is about (what is talked about); what is said-in-
the-talk, as such; the communication; and the making-known" (Heidegger 1962, 206). 
Although Heidegger claims that there are four elements here, as Blattner points out in his 
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discussion of discourse in Heidegger 's Temporal Idealism, "It is hard to tell the 
difference between communication (Mitteilung) and making-known (Bekundung)" 
(Blattner 1999, 71 n51). These are not elements that we can discern by way of analyzing 
language down to its constituent parts; rather, they are, "existential characteristics rooted 
in the state ofDasein's Being, and it is they that first make anything like language 
ontologically possible" (ibid.). Right after enumerating the essential elements of 
discourse, Heidegger remarks somewhat curiously that "the facti cal linguistic form of any 
definite case of discourse, some of these items may be lacking, or may remain unnoticed" 
(Heidegger 1962, 206; emphasis added). One might argue, on the basis of this passage, 
that although discourse may be communicative most of the time, it need not necessarily 
take a communicative or discursive form. This might lend some heft to Wrathall's 
interpretation, for it seems possible that Heidegger indicating that discourse can be 
instantiated without the presence of communication. However, I am not convinced that 
we must affirm this conclusion because the "lacking" might well be interpreted as 
meaning simply that she who is attempting to discourse is doing so poorly due to 
laziness, cultural ignorance, fatigue, or any number of other reasons, and thus failing to 
communicate. Indeed, as we saw in our discussion of §7 of Being and Time, Heidegger 
believes that there are failed instances of discourse. 
Included in §34 of Being and Time are some unusual examples of discourse, 
which, I argue, offer definitive evidence that discourse is a prelinguistic phenomenon: 
hearing and keeping silent. According to Heidegger, hearing is just as much an instance 
of discourse as linguistic expression, and furthermore, it is an especially important 
element in world disclosure, for "[l]istening to ... is Dasein's existential way of Being-
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open as Being-with for Others" (ibid.). Hearing is one's most primordial engagement 
with her social world of significance, and thus to be Dasein is to be open to the meanings 
and possibilities that are available to us given our social and environmental surroundings. 
This is why primarily and most of the time we comport ourselves towards the world 
according to our "they-self' - most of the time we engage with things the way in which 
we are supposed to according to the norms of our worlds. We are able to do this because 
we can hear the meanings that are communicated to us. This "hearing" need not involve 
literally cognizing sound waves, but rather is a kind of primordial receptivity that Dasein 
has for meaning. As Heidegger writes, "Being-with develops in listening to one another 
[Aufeinander-horen], which can be done in several possible ways: following, going along 
with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away" 
(Heidegger 1962, 206-07). We hear not by perceiving pure tones which are then 
organized by the mind into coherent ideas but rather by responding to the meanings we 
encounter. Hearing is a hearkening to the meaningful world. We hear because we already 
understand and are thus able to encounter howling wolves, chanting crowds, gunfire, the 
warmth ofthe sun, the smell of flowers. We dwell amid meaning-laden things. As 
Heidegger writes, "Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is 
understood" (Heidegger 1962, 207). One example of such existential listening is 
succumbing to the pressure to attend - or "go along with" our friend to - a football game 
when one has no previous love for the sport, or steadfastly refusing to go along and 
communicating this by returning your friend's request with a dumbfounded and 
incredulous stare, and thus resisting the allures of the savage ballet.21 
21 It is noteworthy that Heidegger gives us a clue as to how we should understand the phenomenon of 
conscience, which he develops in Division II of Being and Time and which we will discuss below. He 
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Keeping silent is Heidegger' s other unusual example of discourse, and he argues 
that it is, like hearing, one of the most fundamental ways through which we express our 
understanding of the world. Indeed, it is entirely possible that she who remains silent can 
express her understanding "more authentically than the person who is never short of 
words" (Heidegger 1962, 208). The latter is a phenomenon all too familiar to all of us 
who have had to listen to someone endlessly holding-forth about something, but whom in 
actuality tells us nothing, and indeed obscures the issue at hand. Indeed, philosophers are 
probably especially attuned to the possibility of stringing hundreds ofpages ofwords 
together without ever expressing anything about the significance of the world. And 
conversely, in keeping silent, even if only for a moment, we can tell something of great 
significance.22 This point is well illustrated by, interestingly enough, a lyric from Townes 
VanZandt's song "Rake," in which a wild young man says, "You look at me now, and 
don't think I don't know what all your eyes are a sayin' ."The wrathfully judgmental eyes 
of a community communicate their condemnation of the wild young man without anyone 
having to utter a single word. This is because there is clearly something to be said, and 
indeed something is said, in the silence. As Heidegger writes, "in that case one's reticence 
... makes something manifest, and does away with 'idle talk'" (ibid.). Without relying on 
language, the community shows the young man that he has failed to live up to a norm. 
Heidegger finds significant the fact that the Greeks apparently had no word of 
their own for language (or at least what Heidegger understands "language" to denote in 
Being and Time). What they did understand, according to Heidegger, is that human 
writes: "Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being- as in hearing the voice ofthe friend whom every Dasein carries with it" (Heidegger 
1962, 206). 
22 We here merely note the fact that many have often accused Heidegger of doing just this! 
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beings are the beings who have logos - that is, they are the beings that discourse. It is a 
mistake to interpret the fact that humans have logos to mean that they are rational 
animals, for this "covers up the phenomenal basis for this definition of Dasein" 
(Heidegger 1962, 208). Discourse is the phenomenon upon which such an understanding 
is founded and can be meaningful: "Man shows up as the entity which talks. This does 
not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to him, but rather that he is 
the entity which is such as to discover the world and Dasein itself' (Heidegger 1962, 208-
209). Thus, Dasein is not merely the being who has reason, or who expresses meanings 
with a symbolic system, but rather Dasein is the being who is worldly, who dwell in 
worlds, who find itself always already enmeshed in a structure of intelligibility and 
significance. Furthermore, we are the beings who develop understandings of what it 
means to be with each other and who we are in relation to all of this. Discourse is the 
final piece of the world-disclosure or world discovery process, for through its expressive 
practice it throws light upon the various meanings and entities that for the most part 
silently sustain Dasein's existence. Dasein is the being who has logos because it is the 
being that both discovers a meaningful world and whose world is uniquely amenable to 
being talked about. 
The Discourse of Conscience 
Before moving on, it will be helpful to briefly discuss Heidegger's interpretation 
of the phenomenon of conscience from Division II of Being and Time, for as we learned 
above, Wrathall regards this as a particularly strong example of a non-communicative 
mode of discourse. Initially, Wrathall seems to stand on firm ground in making this claim 
based on the following passage: 
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The fact that what is called in the call [of conscience] has not been formulated in 
words, does not give this phenomenon the indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, 
but merely indicates that our understanding of what is 'called' is not to be tied up 
with an expectation of anything like a communication. (Heidegger 1962, 318) 
Wrathall seems content to let this passage stand without much analysis, and given that 
Heidegger seemingly explicitly asserts that the discourse of conscience 'is not to be tied 
up with an expectation of anything like a communication," this is not a condemnable 
stance to take. I will argue, however, that this need not be damning for the 
communicative understanding of discourse for the following two reasons: First, 
Heidegger uses two different senses of communication in Being and Time: in the 
pejorative sense of the transference of information from the interior of one person's mind 
into the interior of another person's mind, and as the general or existential phenomenon 
of communication that he equates with discourse. 23 Second, a careful reading of what 
follows this passage shows that a strong case can be made that conscience is a peculiar 
kind existential communication that takes place between different senses of the self. 
The phenomenon of conscience is often characterized as either an instance of God 
speaking to us and condemning us for transgressing divine law, or a result of our 
reckoning with own guilt and shame resulting from the realization that we have done 
something morally wrong. Heidegger's interpretation of conscience, however, is captured 
by neither of these examples. Heidegger rejects the former characterization of the 
significance of conscience. The "accuser" in the discourse of conscience cannot be God 
or anyone else, for as Heidegger writes, 
If the caller is asked about its name, status, origin, or repute, it not only refuses to 
answer, but does not even leave the slightest possibility of one's making it into 
something with which one can be familiar when one's understanding ofDasein 
has a 'worldly' orientation. (Heidegger 1962, 319) 
23 Cf. Heidegger 1962, p. 205. 
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To assign an identity to the caller, then, is to take us beyond the bounds of what we can 
consider proper phenomenological evidence. Heidegger's position is somewhat closer to 
the second characterization, but with the significant difference that Heidegger' s 
conception of conscience is opposed to imbuing the phenomenon with any specifically 
moral significance. Furthermore, Heidegger does indeed understand conscience as a 
peculiar type of discourse, one that is genuinely communicative. How this is possible is 
elusive at first, for we have already ruled out the possibility that the discourse of 
conscience takes the form of a communication between two different beings. Thus, we 
must clarify, in Heidegger's terminology, "who is called by the call [of conscience] but 
also who does the calling, how the one to whom the appeal is made is related to the one 
who calls, and how this 'relationship' must be taken ontologically as a way in which 
these are interconnected in their Being" (ibid.). Clarifying "who" is involved in 
conscience and how it is carried out, I will argue, will show that it is a genuinely 
communicative phenomenon. 
Who is involved in the call of conscience becomes clearer when Heidegger states: 
"In conscience Dasein calls itself' (Heidegger 1962, 320). We might initially be inclined 
to interpret this as meaning that conscience is a merely solipsistic event wherein one 
merely "talks to herself." Heidegger obviates this interpretation, however, when he writes 
"Ontologically, however, it is not enough to answer that Dasein is at the same time both 
the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made" (ibid.). The notion that in conscience 
we are merely ''talking to ourselves" is not true to the phenomenon precisely because it 
does not account for the way in which conscience assails us as a call. As Heidegger 
writes, "the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor 
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prepared for nor voluntarily performed" (ibid.). But how, then, does Dasein act as both 
the caller and the called? According to Heidegger, who is called is Dasein in its normal, 
everyday absorption in the they-self, i.e. the self with which Dasein normally engage in 
the world. Dasein's they-self does not take responsibility for owning up to the norms that 
guide its life because they are the norms that everyone else lives by. The caller is 
Dasein's "ownmost potentiality-for-Being." The call assails Dasein because it is the 
being that must be answerable for how it lives. The life ofDasein is not (merely) an 
animalistic struggle for survival for Dasein is the being who must ground its activities in 
meaningfulness. It must take over a possibility for being that is already available to it as a 
result of its social embeddedness and make itself answerable for it. We are called .from 
ourselves, for we are called by our ownmost potentiality, but also from beyond ourselves, 
for our ownmost selves are, proximally and for the most part, ontologically distant as a 
result of our enmeshment in our social contexts. 
Heidegger argues that conscience "discourses in the uncanny mode of keeping 
silent" (Heidegger 1962, 322). As we have shown above, this does not preclude the 
possibility that conscience is communicative because keeping silent is one of the most 
originary modes of communicative discourse. The discourse must necessarily remain 
silent because when we are assailed by conscience the ready-to-hand answers to our 
questions that are usually proffered by the "they" are no longer available, and one is 
called "back from this into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being" (ibid.). 
When we are struck by the call of conscience, the normal world of significance has 
ceased to claim us as meaningful, and we are left with only the core of our own being. 
Heidegger describes this experience thusly: 
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Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which, in its 
thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being 
(ahead of itself ... ). Dasein is falling into the "they" (in Being-already-alongside 
the world of its concern), and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The 
call of conscience - that is, conscience itself- has its ontological possibility in the 
fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care. (Heidegger 1962, 322-23). 
Conscience, then, is a form of communication between two ontologically distinct parts of 
ourselves. When we are gripped by anxiety, and the normal, readily available answers to 
our questions about life lose their salience for us, the call of conscience assails us from 
our ownmost potentiality for being and forces us to reevaluate where we have been and 
where we are going so that we may either affirm it or change direction altogether. As 
Crowell writes, "For Heidegger, conscience is not itself a kind of private reason but an 
ontological condition for distinguishing between external and internal reasons, between a 
quasi-mechanical conformism and a commitment responsive to the normativity of norms" 
(Crowell2007, 53-54). This is because in the core of its being, Dasein is not the being 
that is supposed to blindly and unthinkingly derive its norms from others, but rather, as 
the being that is, at its very basis, care, it must choose to take up these norms and claim 
them for itself. It is a genuine communication that reminds us that we must own our own 
way of being and not rely exclusively on the endorsement of the "they." From an "ontic" 
perspective, the caller is "nobody," for we can identify no other source for the call. But 
when we investigate the call from an ontological perspective, that is, when we try to 
discern the meaning and significance of the call, we see that ''the call comes from that 
entity which in each case I myself am" (Heidegger 1962, 323). Our response to the call is 
to own up to our unique singularity, to the primitive ''thatness" that underlies our being-
in-the-world. It is in this sense that we may understand conscience as communicative. As 
Carman writes, "To say that conscience is discursive is not to say that it has the structure 
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of conversation, or even soliloquy, but simply that it consists in one's expressive relation 
to the fact of one's own concrete particularity" (Carman 2003, 295). 
In sum, it now seems safe to posit the following three conclusions about 
Heidegger's concept of discourse. First, and especially given the role of both hearing and 
keeping silent for the constitution of the phenomenon, it is a prelinguistic phenomenon -
albeit one that also manifests itself in every meaningful use of language. Thus we are, so 
far, in agreement with Wrathall's understanding of discourse. Secondly, however, and 
contra Wrathall, it is a communicative phenomenon, for it is something that expresses 
our being-in-the-world, which is always already being-with. Thirdly, we can now with 
justification argue that Carman's interpretation is the most accurate and illuminative of 
the essence of discourse. But if this is so, where does this leave our overarching quest, 
inspired by Wrathall's work, to find continuity in a strong sense between Heidegger's 
early and late translations for logos, namely discourse and language? That is, if we agree 
that Wrathall's interpretation of discourse in Being and Time is actually closer to 
Heidegger's concept of interpretation (Auslegung), and thus mistaken, then what is left as 
a link between discourse as a communicative phenomenon and the later notion of 
language? In the next section, I will argue two main points. The first is that the later 
Heidegger's concept of"language" does remain, in a sense, "prelinguistic," and therefore 
that Carman and the other adherents of the standard view are mistaken about the later 
Heidegger's supposed linguistic idealism. The second point is that the connection 
between the early concept of discourse and the later concept of language is not quite as 
similar as Wrathall seems to contend. 
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Chapter Three: Interrogating "Language" with the Later 
Heidegger 
Language becomes a massive question for the later Heidegger. Many of his later 
works interrogate the phenomenon of language, and one of his best known later books is 
even entitled On the Way to Language. Why does Heidegger's later work turn 
increasingly towards language? In a late essay on the subject simply entitled "Language", 
Heidegger argues that it "belongs to the closest neighborhood of man's being" 
(Heidegger 2001, 187). This tells us something about Heidegger' s motivation for 
investigating language, for the arche guiding his later works on language is "for once, to 
get to just where we are already" (Heidegger 2001, 188). It seems, then, that Heidegger's 
goal for his later work on language is not radically opposed to the project he began in 
Being and Time, for he is once again attempting to lay bare who and what we are in light 
of an ontological dimension that is so near to us that we scarcely even notice it. In Being 
and Time, it is Dasein's average everydayness and the existentiale that constitute this 
dimension. Now, in his later work, it is language that we miss. Does this then entail that 
Heidegger is a linguistic idealist, and that to understand the being of the human being is 
to understand the way in which language shapes the unfolding and disclosure of the 
world? In one sense the answer is obviously yes, as the quotes we have just discussed 
seem to imply. However, if we are to take Wrathall's arguments seriously, there is much 
room for an alternate interpretation, for what Heidegger means by "language" may well 
be something radically other than what traditional linguistic idealist philosophies have 
assumed. There is good reason to at least entertain this notion, for, as Heidegger writes in 
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his lectures on Pannenides, "Even though our thoughtful inquiry is aiming at basic 
meaning, we are nevertheless guided by an entirely different conception of the word and 
of language" (Heidegger 1998, 21). We should also note, with Wrathall, that "language," 
like "discourse," is one ofHeidegger's translations for the Greek concept logos. This, of 
course, could mean many things, and does not automatically lend support to the notion 
that by "language" Heidegger means something similar or analogous to what he calls 
"discourse" in Being and Time. Bearing this in mind, we turn now to an examination of 
"Language." 
The "Language" Essay 
Heidegger begins "Language" by noting that most people regard language as 
simply one entity amongst others, one that has a specific nature that can be discovered by 
interrogating it with presupposed scientific concepts in order to make clear its essential 
features, much like we might dissect a frog in order to understand the workings of its 
cardiovascular system. In the language of Being and Time, it might be said that prevailing 
understandings oflanguage regard it as something present-at-hand whose essence can be 
discerned through isolating it and enumerating its essential properties.24 In this essay, 
Heidegger proposes to do something entirely different than what other philosophers and 
linguists do when they interrogate language: 
We do not wish to assault language in order to force it into the grip of ideas 
already fixed beforehand. We do not wish to reduce the nature of language to a 
concept, so that this concept may provide a generally useful view of language that 
will lay to rest all further notions about it. (Heidegger 2001, 188) 
24 That he also no longer considers "language" to be something ready-to-hand will soon become clear (or 
that which the later Heidegger denotes with the term "language" is not something of this nature). 
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Instead, Heidegger, ever the phenomenologisr5, proposes to focus solely on the 
phenomenon of language itself and nothing else, so that we may have what he calls 
elsewhere an "experience with language." Pursuant to this end, he asks the reader to think 
about the formal tautology "language is language" in order to avoid reducing language to 
something else or subjecting it to the artificial imposition of alien concepts. For 
Heidegger, when we interrogate the phenomenon of language, we are not trying to "get 
anywhere," or to use it as a premise in an argument, or even to scientifically investigate 
its nature for the sake of pure research. Instead, one's aim should be to let language itself 
in its strange singularity come clear. Heidegger suggests that in this exercise, we will 
learn something simple, yet profoundly important about ourselves and our world, or, as 
we noted above, we will" get to just where we are already" (ibid.). An important 
question remains, however: Is Heidegger merely exhorting us to adopt a different 
methodology for the study of ontic languages like Dutch and Yiddish, as is sometimes 
assumed, or is he rather, as Wrathall has suggested, asking us to direct our thinking 
towards the same prelinguistic logos that he understood as discourse in Being and Time? 
What is unconcealed in a phenomenological experience with language? 
Heidegger's enigmatic answer is that language speaks, though in a manner of speaking 
that is distinct from human speech. In what kind of speech does language speak, and why 
(and how) is it necessarily different from human speaking? And furthermore, what, then, 
is human speaking, from which the speaking of language is distinct but to which it is 
essentially linked? Heidegger begins answering these questions when he claims that the 
25 Somewhat heretically, I read Heidegger's later work as exemplary phenomenological philosophy, and 
feel quite justified in doing so, for as Crowell points out, referring to Heidegger's later works, "[I]f one 
reads them in the spirit of phenomenological seeing and description, which Heidegger never abandoned in 
practice even if he abandoned it as a designation for his project, one may discern a keen attention to the 
way that the most ordinary things can continue to address us even in their very unobtrusiveness" (Crowell 
2001, 220). 
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speaking of language is not, as is usually supposed, the activation of certain biological 
organs for making sounds or for hearing. In this latter view, Heidegger discerns three 
presuppositions which serve to obscure the essence of language: First, that speech is 
expression in the sense of something externalizing itself, i.e. communicating some 
internal thought out into the world. This is noteworthy, for in Being and Time Heidegger 
also argues that discourse is misunderstood if it is supposed to be essentially 
communicative in this sense. The second prejudice is that the speaking of language is 
only an activity of human beings- something that only human beings do and that would 
be absurd to attribute to the amorphous entity "language." The third prejudice is that 
"human expression is always a presentation and representation of the real and the unreal" 
(Heidegger 2001, 190). In other words, that language speaks primarily by making 
assertions about things that are either existing (for example, Rice University) or not 
existing entities (such as a purple unicorn standing on my back yard). 
These basic prejudices, according to Heidegger, have been in place in one form or 
another for the last two and a half millennia, and therefore it seems absurd that anyone 
would question their indubitable veracity. As Heidegger writes, "No one would dare to 
declare incorrect, let alone reject as useless, the identification of language as audible 
utterance of inner emotions, as human activity, as a representation by image and concept" 
(Heidegger 2001, 191). The understanding of language has become a closed system of 
presuppositions that cannot be questioned from outside, on pain of absurdity. And yet, 
following his practice of calling into question our understanding of basic concepts, this is 
precisely what Heidegger intends to do, for although he does not deny the factual veracity 
of the any of these particular characterizations of language, he is adamant that the 
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tradition is missing something fundamental about the primordial nature of language itself. 
But what is missing? What is hidden in the "abyss" opened up by unusual statements like 
"language is language" and "language speaks"? 
Heidegger chooses Georg Trakl's poem "A Winter Evening" to illustrate the 
strange phenomenon of the speaking of language, "for what is spoken purely is the 
poem" (ibid.).26 Heidegger does not explain why he so often privileges poetry in his late 
discussions of language, but he seems to believe that what is spoken in poetry is 
somehow closer to the speaking language itself, and that it is thereby helpful in breaking 
the spell of the prejudices of our usual understanding of language. It is significant that in 
this essay and in many of Heidegger' s other writings on language, he does indeed choose 
to discuss poems as paradigmatic of the "work" that language does when it comes to 
. world disclosure, for they are undeniably literary works. This is a marked contrast with 
the discussion of discourse in Being and Time, in which the examples of discourse can all 
be construed as prelinguistic, and this perhaps casts some doubt on the plausibly of 
concluding that the later concept oflanguage is for Heidegger prelinguistic. But before 
26 For the reader's reference and edification, here is the complete text of"A Winter Evening" in Albert 
Hofstadter's translation: 
A Winter Evening 
Window with falling snow is arrayed. 
Long tolls the vesper bell, 
The house is provided well, 
The table is for many laid. 
Wandering ones, more than a few, 
Come to the door on darksome courses. 
Golden blooms the tree of graces 
Drawing up the earth's cool dew. 
Wanderer quietly steps within; 
Pain has turned the threshold to stone. 
There lie, in limpid brightness shown, 
Upon the table bread and wine. (Quoted in Heidegger 2001, 207-08) 
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settling on this negative conclusion, let us first try to find out what is really at stake in 
Heidegger' s discussion of language. 
The first thing that Heidegger notes about the poem is the title itself: "A Winter 
Evening." One might argue that there is nothing important or distinctive about this simple 
title, or about the entire text of the poem, for that matter. It is, of course, structurally 
sound, clearly written, and is comprised of very simple statements, whose propositional 
content is, for the most part, easy to extract and reduce. According to Heidegger, however 
dwelling on the phenomenon of this poem a bit further shows that it is something quite 
other than a mere collection of statements about the reality or unreality of entities in the 
world. Heidegger points out that if we were to judge the title using the usual 
understanding of language, it would signal that the poem is describing a particular winter 
evening in a particular geographical location. Yet this is precisely not what the poem 
does, for "A Winter Evening" does not denote a spatio-temporal coordinate in the 
universe, such as the winter evening of January 14, 1956 in Iowa City, Iowa, at all. But if 
not this, does it merely provide an image that was produced by Trakl's imagination? Is 
Trakl simply expressing his innermost thoughts, a vision from out of his sensitive, poetic 
soul? While acknowledging that this is a tempting answer, Heidegger denies that such is 
the case. In fact, for Heidegger, "Who the author is remains unimportant" and that the 
mastery of a poet "consists in this, that the poem can deny the poet's person and name" 
(Heidegger 2001, 193).27 Thus, this poem and what it shows us is not the speaking of a 
human being at all, but rather of language itself. Poetry gives a voice to the primal 
27 This echoes Heidegger's claim in The Origin of the Work of Art that in the case of great works of art, the 
identity of the artist is superfluous. As he writes there, "It is precisely in great art ... that the artist remains 
inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative 
process for the work to emerge" (Heidegger 2001, 39). 
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speaking of language. Language itself speaks something else - but what? Heidegger' s 
answer is once again enigmatic: he claims that the speaking of language calls. 
What is called in the speaking of language, and to where? According to 
Heidegger, things are called - not to be present amongst other things present before us, 
like the various objects arrayed on my cluttered desk, but rather to "a presence sheltered 
in absence" (Heidegger 2001, 197). The "naming" that is carried out by the calling of 
language "does not hand out titles, it does not apply terms, but it calls into the word. The 
naming calls. Calling brings closer what it calls" (Heidegger 2001, 196; emphasis 
added). The calling of language, says Heidegger, brings into close proximity something 
that is uncalled, something that is, but which does not yet grip us in its meaningful 
salience. This is strikingly similar to the way in which discourse brings to the fore the 
meanings in which we are enmeshed due to our disposition and understanding, and is 
akin to the way that Heidegger argues in Being and Time that Dasein "is such as to 
discover the world and Dasein itself' (Heidegger 1962, 208-9). For the later Heidegger, 
the calling of language invites us to recognize that there is meaning at all; it is Dasein's 
originary entryway into a world of significance. And yet, despite this similarity, there is 
also a profound gap between early and late Heidegger on this point, for language, in the 
later Heidegger's sense, seems to operate outside the realm of the human, and the role of 
the human in the speaking of language seems unclear. That is, it seems no longer the case 
that it is we who discover things through communicating with one another (and most 
primordially, with ourselves), but rather it is the saying oflanguage that articulates the 
intelligibility of things independently of us. For the moment, however, we will set aside 
this divergence, and retrain our focus of the progression of Heidegger' s argument. 
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What is "a presence sheltered in absence"? This is a curious expression, but I take 
it to mean that, in the speaking of language, things are called to their possibilities, to be 
present to us in their potential, rather than to their reified being as ontic objects, as things 
that are either real or unreal. The thing called in poetry is not here before the reader of the 
poem as a physical presence, as something "real" (hence its absence), yet it is still 
present in its rich possibility for having a meaningful impact on us - that is, it is present 
as fitting into and having meaning for a mortal existence. Heidegger argues that things 
are called by a naming "so that they may bear upon men as things" (ibid.). Naming is 
perhaps something as simple as the poetic expression of the possible meaning of a thing. 
But what does it mean to be a thing and what does it mean for something to bear upon us 
as a thing? A "thing" does not, for Heidegger, denote just any entity or object in the 
world to which we tack on names and titles. Rather, a thing is understood as something 
that has its proper place within a network of significance in which it may be appraised for 
how well it lives up to its established role within the network. Heidegger is trying to 
open us to a possibility for understanding thinghood that underlies the usual 
understanding of a thing as being an object that is present before us and thus objectively 
determinable. Poetry, by naming things, calls them into a sheltered place so that they can 
have bearing upon us, that their possibilities can be opened to us.28 Perhaps poetry, if we 
understand it as akin to logos, invites things into a meaningful context so that they may 
thereby have bearing on us as crucial elements in the formation of our world. A thing is 
thus for Heidegger not just an item to be dissected by analytical thinking - indeed, this is 
why poetry calls things to a presence sheltered in absence, for as soon as we try to have 
28 This is perhaps not unlike what we learn about the usefulness of the shoes in Van Gogh's painting, as is 
discussed in "The Origin of the Work of Art" (Cf. Heidegger 2001, 33-4). 
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an all-encompassing view of a thing, it vanishes, disperses, or breaks down, and thus no 
longer has bearing on us as the meaningful thing that it is. Things are the primary 
constituents that constitute our meaningful world. For example, the bread and wine that 
are named in the last line of"A Winter Evening" are invited into the world of the 
Christian as meaningful constitutive elements of the Christian sacrament that point 
towards the sacrifice of Jesus and its redemptive power. Poetry has the unique ability to 
let things, to use another curious Heideggerian turn of phrase, "thing." Heidegger writes, 
"By thinging, things carry out world" (ibid.). Thus, rather than simply being resources for 
sating hunger and causing intoxication, bread and wine help to constitute a world by 
bearing it, or as Heidegger says, by gestating it. A meaningful and encompassing world 
is born out of the "thinging" of the things that make it up. In naming things, language 
gathers the world together, joining it together, and yes, even articulates a world of 
significance. By listening to the thinging of things that is named by poetry we can find 
our own unique place in the world. 
Heidegger seems to suggest that the unique mediator that obtains between world 
as meaningful context and the things that bear and sustain it is nothing other than 
originary language. He writes, "The word consequently no longer means a distinction 
established between objects only by our representations. Nor is it merely a relation 
obtaining between world and thing, so that a representation coming upon it can establish 
it" (Heidegger 2001, 200). Language thus does not simply distinguish one thing or 
another. Rather, it "disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world; it disclosingly 
appropriates world into the granting of things" (ibid.). Language shows how things 
constitute the world, and how the world makes things possible in the first place. It is only 
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in light of language that things and worlds can enter into their co-constitutive, reciprocal 
relationship. It appropriates in so far as it is, as Wrathall notes, ''the mutual conditioning 
through which we and the things around us "come into our own" - that is, become what 
each can be when conditioned by the other" (Wrathall2011, 206). Language, as the 
taking-place of the appropriation, allows world and thing to unfold in their potential. But 
where do we humans with our human speech fit into this picture? Heidegger remarks that 
the speaking of language is not anything human. And yet, we are still somehow 
essentially connected or "given to" speaking, for we are indeed linguistic creatures. 
According to Heidegger, "The word 'linguistic' as it is here used means: having taken 
place out ofthe speaking oflanguage" (Heidegger 2001, 205). Thus, the human way of 
being has been allowed to become what it is through the speaking of language. To be 
human, in other words, is to respond to the norms that we, as "linguistic" beings, can 
recognize in the speaking of originary language. That is, human speaking arises as an 
expression of the standards or measures of our worlds. All of our human ways of 
speaking rest upon the speaking of originary language. We speak insofar as we respond 
to the speaking of the logos. 
On "The Way to Language" 
Just how far is Heidegger's later conception oflanguage from his concept of 
discourse in Being and Time? We have noted some evocative similarities between the 
two concepts in the last section, but in order to come to at least a tentative conclusion as 
to how closely - or tenuously - these concepts are linked, more must be said. In this 
spirit I turn now to another ofHeidegger's later essays: "The Way to Language," 
wherein, I will argue, Heidegger himself draws many striking parallels between these two 
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ideas. The similarities, as well as the differences, that Heidegger implicitly highlights 
here are most illuminating. We will proceed by way of analyzing a number of longer 
passages in which Heidegger is clearly drawing parallels with the discussion of discourse 
in Being and Time. 
We begin with the following: "What unfolds essentially in language is saying as 
pointing. Its showing does not culminate in a system of signs. Rather, all signs arise from 
a showing in whose realm and for whose purpose they can be signs" (Heidegger 1993, 
41 0). Here we find an interesting similarity with the discussion of discourse in Being and 
Time, for the "work" that language does in world disclosure once again does not 
culminate in a system of signs, and thus in this sense, language for the later Heidegger 
may rightly be said, as Wrathall claims, to be prelinguistic. Indeed, this passage strongly 
militates against Lafont's argument, for Heidegger explicitly stresses that signs "arise 
from a showing in whose realm and for whose purpose they can be signs." Just as is the 
case with discourse, all sign systems, including, presumably, all ontic languages, are 
founded upon and made meaningful through the articulation of meaning that is carried 
out by language. One can even imagine that Heidegger would affirm that to the 
significations articulated by the saying of language, words accrue. Languages in the sense 
of systems of signs are thus, contra Lafont, not the primary source of meaning for the 
later Heidegger, but they instead remain dependent upon an originary articulation of 
meaning, i.e. the saying as pointing that illuminates the measure of the things in our 
world. One crucial difference with the discussion of discourse arises, however, in the 
passage that immediately follows: 
However, in view of the well-joined structure of the saying we dare not attribute 
showing either exclusively or definitively to human doing. Self-showing as 
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appearing characterizes the coming to presence or withdrawal to absence of every 
manner and degree of thing present. Even when showing is accomplished by 
means of our saying, such showing or referring is preceded by a thing's letting 
itselfbe shown. (ibid.; emphasis added) 
This articulates a significant difference between the communicative way in which the 
early Heidegger's holds that discourse articulates the intelligibility of the world on the 
one hand, and the way in which the saying of language is now located outside of the ken 
of"human doing" on the other. Heidegger, in his later philosophy, seems to move away 
from the human-centric (or, more accurately, Dasein-centric) orientation of Being and 
Time. That is, the articulation of intelligibility seems no longer to be rooted in one's 
communicative discourse with one another and with oneself, but rather in the self-
showing appearing of meaning that occurs, apparently, without the aid of the community 
of human beings. Meaning, for the later Heidegger, is prior to its constitution by human 
understanding and disposition. That is not to say that human saying cannot help with this 
process, as Heidegger indicates, but rather that for human saying to bring to presence the 
meaning of something (perhaps through poetic speaking?), the thing must already show 
itself to us as something meaningful. We will return to the significance of this difference 
below, but first we should note some more interesting areas of overlap between 
Heidegger's early and late position. 
Heidegger goes on to make some interesting remarks about the significance of 
hearing for human speaking, remarks that are once again quite familiar to the careful 
reader of §34 of Being and Time: 
We know speech to be the articulate vocalization of thought by means of the 
instruments of speech. However, speech is simultaneously hearing. Speaking and 
hearing are customarily set in opposition to one another: one person speaks, the 
other hears. Yet hearing does not merely accompany and encompass speaking, 
such as we find it in conversation. That speaking and hearing occur 
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simultaneously means something more. Speech, taken on its own, is hearing. It is 
listening to the language we speak. Hence speaking is not simultaneously a 
hearing, but is such in advance. Such listening to language precedes all other 
instances of hearing, albeit in an altogether inconspicuous way. We not only 
speak language, we speakfrom out of it. We are capable of doing so only because 
in each case we have already listened to language. What do we hear there? We 
hear language speaking. (Heidegger 1993, 410-11; emphasis in original) 
Hearing as responding, then, as in Being and Time, is a central clue to understanding our 
relationship with language. In actuality, according to Heidegger, human speaking is a 
process of hearing and hearkening to the meanings that are already spoken by language. 
And just as in Being and Time, Heidegger implies that the hearing of abstract, pure 
sounds, or presumably any other variety of "pure experience" is already based upon 
hearing the things that constitute a world. Our human speech is once again dependent on 
a mesh of primal meanings. 29 In contrast with Being and Time, however, where it was 
understood that discourse articulates the meanings constituted by our understanding and 
our disposition, Heidegger once again stresses that human speaking is a listening and 
responding to the articulations opened up no longer primarily by us but rather for us by 
the saying of originary language. Heidegger, I think, characterizes human speech this 
way in order to point out the peculiar way in which we are held in the sway of the 
meaningful context of the world. 
We should also note that "On the Way to Language" contains an elegant 
discussion of the significance of silence, which was an important theme in §34 of Being 
and Time: 
Language speaks by saying, is concerned that our speech, heeding the unspoken, 
29 Lafont might take Heidegger's argument that speech is "listening to the language we speak" as strong 
evidence for her interpretation. We can avoid this conclusion, however, by remembering that, in his 
conversation with the Japanese scholar from "A Dialogue on Language," Heidegger argues that people in 
different worlds, such as the "Eastasian world" versus the "western world," will respond to different 
originary languages. 
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corresponds to what language says. Hence silence too, which one would dearly 
like to subtend to speech as its origin, is already a corresponding. Silence 
corresponds to the noiseless ringing of stillness, the stillness of the saying that 
propriates and shows. (Heidegger 1993, 420) 
In this elusive passage, I argue that we find both another crucial link to Heidegger's early 
discussion of discourse and a clue to how his notion of existential communication 
evolves. Silence, Heidegger contends, is not "subtended" to speech, by which he means 
that silence is not merely the negation or opposite of speaking, or the mere lack of having 
something to say. This, we should recall, is precisely what Heidegger argues about 
silence in Being and Time - that one can only be genuinely silent when one has 
something to say. Silence, we recall, can often say more than any vocal utterance. True 
silence is a meaning-laden phenomenon for Heidegger, for it is an expressive response to 
the noiseless ringing of stillness, the ''thatness" of our belonging to a meaningful world. 
The meaning of silence is no longer grounded in human communicative norms, and yet 
we find that communication is still present in this structure in a modified form, for silence 
corresponds to the meanings articulated by the saying of language. True silence, just as in 
Being and Time, does not arise out of a lack of something to say, but is, on the contrary, a 
measured, proper recognition of and answer to a claim made on us. 
This is remiriiscent of the silent discourse of conscience which we discussed 
earlier and that is so vital to Division II of Being and Time, wherein normal discourse 
breaks down completely and the meaningful mesh ofworldhood no longer claims us as 
significant. Conscience, as we argued earlier, is a silent communication between one's 
ownmost self and one's "they-self." But in Heidegger's later work, to whom or to what 
does silence correspond? To put it very briefly, for the later Heidegger meaning comes 
about independently of us through the relations between the elements of"the fourfold"-
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gods, mortals, earth, and sky. As mortals, we discover ourselves as the unique beings for 
whom meaning is significant and who are able to bear witness to meaning. 
Communication thus is found in this structure in our silent listening and responding to the 
meaningfulness that claims us. The bread and wine that we discussed above in relation to 
Trakl's poem came out of the earth, nurtured by the sky, and were blessed with deep 
significance by a god. For a Christian for whom the sacrament is a meaningful practice, 
the beginning of communication is the recognition of and appropriate response to the 
significance of these things for herself, and the resistance to the leveling-down of their 
thingly essence into mere resources or matter. We no longer come into our own via 
listening to the call of conscience, but rather through learning to see past the reductive 
and technological worldview, which might be structurally analogous to the ''they-self," to 
one's own meaningful world (whether it be the world of the Christian, the Shinto, or the 
atheist), the dimension opened up by earth, sky, gods, and mortals. Language, in 
Heidegger's later sense, articulates the intelligibility of the fourfold by bringing them into 
their essential relations to one another. Human are the "linguistic beings" insofar as we 
are those beings who can understand this, who can listen to the articulations of language 
in its ringing stillness and, and hold ourselves in the sway of its meaningfulness. 
To find a more precise formulation of the relation between language and the 
dimension of meaning, however, seems to be a difficult task. Indeed, it seems to be the 
case that no amount of probing into this issue will yield a definitive answer. Heidegger 
quotes favorably the following dictum from Novalis: "Precisely what is peculiar to 
language -that it concerns itself purely and with itself alone - no one knows" (quoted in 
Heidegger 1993, 422). The decisive difference between Heidegger's early and late 
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thinking on these matters, then, seems to be this, that there is no scientific answer - be it 
an Husserlian phenomenological one or one founded in the natural sciences - to the 
question of the ultimate source of meaning. Otto P<>ggeler's discussion ofthe 
development of Heidegger' s thinking on language is quite informative on this point. 
Regarding Heidegger's early thought, he writes, 
In [Being and Time], Heidegger gains a new approach for the problematic of logic 
and language; he understands these in terms of discourse, that is, discoursing as 
articulating the understanding [disposition] and, therefore, ultimately historical-
temporal being-in-the-world. Consequently, language becomes the articulation of 
the world which is always bursting open. (Poggeler 1991, 220; emphasis added) 
Thus, according to P<>ggeler, discourse is the articulation of the meanings constituted by a 
social and historical world. The world bursts open, for the early Heidegger, through 
Dasein's activities, which we then articulate with discourse. Turning to Heidegger's later 
thinking on language, P<>ggeler writes, 
In the spoken word, that movement of the world-play which Heidegger calls the 
"pealing of stillness" is refracted, the soundless appropriative occurring which 
settles everything into its proper element and thus allows the world to burst forth. 
(P<>ggeler 1991, 227; emphasis added) 
For the later Heidegger, then, human speaking does not articulate a world that is 
constituted by disposition and understanding, but responds to one that is constituted 
through the pealing of stillness ofthe movement ofthe world-play, which is then 
expressed through the saying of language. The role of the human is no longer to 
communicatively discover the intersubjectively constituted world, but rather to allow the 
movement of the world-play (whatever that may be) to burst forth through poetic 
expression. The substance of the difference between the early and later Heidegger is 
felicitously summed up by Thomas Sheehan, who writes, "The crux of the reversal 
(Kehre) between the earlier and later Heidegger is the recognition that human beings do 
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not generate the space of meaning sua sponte but are pulled into it a priori" (Sheehan 
2011, 3). For the later Heidegger, then, our individual and collective projects and moods 
are subsumed in the movement of the history of being, and our task is to be those who 
express this history. Existential communication is no longer between various different 
subjects or Daseins, but between the history of being and the poetically dwelling mortal. 
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Conclusion 
Where do we now stand regarding the question of continuity between Heidegger' s 
early and late philosophy of language and meaning? It seems that we may, despite some 
significant reservations, affirm at least a thin version ofWrathall's thesis, i.e. that 
Heidegger never advanced a philosophy that can be correctly identified as a linguistic 
idealism. The case for the concept of discourse in Being and Time to be understood as 
prelinguistic, we have shown, is fairly straightforward. This is because, as Heidegger 
clearly argues, there are several things which can be understood as instances of discourse 
which are simply not linguistic in nature. The central place of hearing, keeping silent, and 
the existential discourse of conscience all indicate that Heidegger intended discourse to 
be closely linked to, but not identical with language. We can even go so far as to affirm 
that, for the early Heidegger, every use of language is an instance of discourse, but we 
must also affirm that not every instance of discourse is linguistic. We should also note 
here that we have found it necessary to reject Wrathall's contention that discourse is both 
prelinguistic andprecommunicative. This, as our study of Carman's arguments and of 
§34 of Being and Time have shown, does not stand up to scrutiny, for Heidegger clearly 
intends for discourse to be the articulation of a social space of meaning that is constituted 
through discursive interactions with others in which we take the measure things and 
thereby first allow them to claim us as meaningful. And furthermore, although the 
ontically solitary discourse of conscience might seem to give the lie to this notion, we 
have shown that even this experience is an ontologically communicative one through 
which Dasein discovers the norms that are most important for its own life. 
The case for arguing that Heidegger's later writings on "language" also do not 
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constitute a form of linguistic idealism was more difficult to make, yet I believe we have 
shown that this is the most plausible way to understand what is at stake in "Language" 
and "The Way to Language." Contrary to the arguments of Lafont and Carman, and in 
agreement with Wrathall, it seems clear that what "language" and ''the saying of 
language" denote in Heidegger' s later works cannot be properly understood as the ontic 
languages that we use every day. As we have shown, Heidegger draws a distinction 
between the saying of language that articulates the well-jointed structure of an historical 
world, and the human speaking that derives its meaning through listening and responding 
to the saying of language. Indeed, we might well concede that in a certain sense 
Heidegger is a linguistic idealist in his later work, with the caveat that the primordial 
saying of language that articulates the meaning of historical worlds is not something that 
a linguistic idealist would recognize as a language. That is to say, Heidegger is not 
committed to the view that we can only encounter as meaningful those things that have 
been named in our language. Heidegger might be said to be a linguistic idealist in his 
later works in the sense that one must be in the thrall of a particular logos in order to 
encounter a thing in the way that one is supposed to given the meaningful context in 
which it is a thing. As Wrathall writes, 
In its core, most fundamental meaning, 'language' in [the phrase "language is the 
house of being"] is not 'human speaking- it is not the words, noises and marks, 
the rules, and so on that we normally think of when we talk about language. 
Instead, [it] means 'saying,' which Heidegger defines in terms of 'a showing' 
(Wrathal12011, 154). 
Trakl' s bread and wine is a good example of this, for in order to grasp the way that these 
things are meaningful for him, one must, like Trakl, be given over to, and speak from out 
of, the Christian world. Thus if we take two persons, one who is a German and a faithful 
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Catholic, and one who is an American and an avowed atheist, they will both be perfectly 
able to have access to the entities we denote with the words bread and wine or Brot und 
Wein as things that one can purchase at the local supermarket, but only the Catholic will 
have access to bread and wine as sacred symbols of Jesus Christ's sacrifice. This is not 
because she speaks a certain ontic language, but because she is claimed by the world of 
Christianity which is, in part, constituted by bread and wine. 
This is not to say that Heidegger's thinking on these matters does not profoundly 
change in the time between Being and Time and his later writings. Indeed, I have argued 
that the shift is more radical than Wrathall acknowledges, for while discourse is a 
thoroughly communicative phenomenon in Being and Time, we have seen in "Language" 
and "The Way to Language" that this characteristic of logos has either dropped off the 
map or deeply changed. My contention is that the latter is closer to the truth, for, as we 
have seen, human speaking arises, for the later Heidegger, out of a hearing and 
correspondence with the originary saying ofthe logos. Interpersonal communication, 
whether by means of symbolic systems or body language, is secondary to this 
correspondence, just as the other existentiale of disposition and understanding become 
subordinate to and constituted by the norms established by the ringing of stillness. For the 
later Heidegger, we take our cues what is right, fitting, or best from the gods that rule 
over us, the mortals who have gone before us, and even the earth beneath our feet and the 
sky above our heads. Another and related difference between the early and late work is 
that the articulation of meaning is no longer something that is carried out in and through 
human discursive communication, but rather through the world-play of the mysterious 
movement of being itself. This is perhaps why Heidegger chooses to formally abandon 
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the project of phenomenological philosophizing and instead devote himselfto the task of 
"thinking" (even if, in actuality, abandoned neither phenomenology nor philosophy in 
practice) for in his later works he comes to understand human finitude in such an extreme 
light that we are no longer capable ofhaving a systematic or scientific grasp of the 
meaning of being. Thinkers and poets may still poetically express partial truths by way 
oflistening to the ringing of stillness that speaks to us out of the saying of the logos. But 
just as surely as we are claimed by the movement of being, we cannot every hope to have 
a complete understanding of this movement. For the later Heidegger, philosophy is no 
longer a task of discovering ourselves and our world but rather a task of allowing 
ourselves to become conduits through which the essential truths of the world may give 
themselves expression. 
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